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MIGRANT CHILDREN, COMPULSORY
EDUCATION AND THE RULE
OF LAW IN CHINA
Brian Hollandt

INTRODUCTION

On June 29, 2006, China adopted a revised Compulsory Education
Law' intended in large part to ensure the right to education for the children
of migrant workers, 2 and to curtail the fees frequently assessed to students
attending public schools.' The revised law came into force on September 1,
2006 4-the beginning of the academic calendar year-the fruit of more
than three years of legislative efforts 5 to update the two-decade-old law. 6
That same summer and throughout the fall local authorities in Beijing, the nation's capital, ordered the closing of more than 200 private
schools for the children of migrant workers. 7 The official media reported
t J.D. 2008, University at Buffalo Law School, The State University of New
York; M.A., 2004, Teachers College, Columbia University; B.A., 1998, Union College. I would like to thank Professor Martha McCluskey for her guidance and feedback during my research for and drafting of this Comment. I would also like to
thank Sylvia Borenstein, Co-Editors-in-Chief Elsa Hemdindez and Adam O'Brian,
and the members of the Buffalo Human Rights Law Review, as well as Amy Frisch
for their help in editing this Comment. Any errors that remain in the pages that
follow are entirely my own.
1 Yi wu jiao yu fa [Compulsory Education Law (revised)] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Congress, June 29, 2006, effective Sept. 1, 2006)
STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Compulsory Education Law (revised)], available at LAWINFOCHINA.

See, e.g., China Revises Law to Ensure Compulsory Educationfor Children of
Migrant Workers, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, May 3, 2006, available at Factiva [hereinafter XINHUA NEWS AGENCY].
2

3

See id.
I Compulsory Education Law (revised), supra note 1.
I The revision of the Compulsory Education Law was incorporated the into a
five-year legislation plan by the National People's Congress Standing Committee

(the "NPCSC") in 2003. Chairman Wu Bangguo Addresses Chinese Congress
Standing Committee, BBC MONITORING ASIA PACIFIC, May 2, 2006, available at
Factiva (text of the report on NPCSC Chairman Wu Bangguo's speech prepared by
the official Chinese news agency, Xinhua).
6
Compulsory Education Law (revised), supra note 1.
7 Geoffrey York, China Shuts Needy Pupils out of School, GLOBE & MAIL, Sept.
12, 2006, at A16. Similar closures occurred in Shanghai. See Howard W. French,
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the students at these schools were to be integrated into the public school
system.8 In reality, a significant number of the approximately 95,000 students in attendance at these condemned schools were denied access to the
capital's public schools 9 on the same terms offered to the children of permanent residents.
The nearly simultaneous promulgation of national legislation intended to "ensure the right of migrant children to education,"' 10 the condemnation of as many as 200 migrant schools in Beijing, and the capital city's
failure to integrate the tens of thousands of children affected by the closures
during the summer and autumn of 2006 is profound and public evidence of
an ongoing and worsening crisis in China's efforts to implement the rule of
law.
The "rule of law" is a contested concept, the precise definition of
which has eluded legal scholars for generations. Though the definition of
the rule of law remains elusive, consensus generally exists among scholars
as to the basic contours of the concept. In its broadest iteration, the rule of
law is commonly thought of as some combination of legal form, process,
and substance which, taken together, protects a society's rights and values
from infringement by government and individuals. In China, under the constitution and supporting national law such as the Compulsory Education
Law, children have a right to free public schooling during a nine-year compulsory education period, regardless of their parents' registration status.
For migrant children, this right is honored more in the breach than it is in
the observance. The under-enforcement of migrant children's right to education is part and parcel to a larger underdevelopment of individual, political, civil, and human rights characteristic of China's law reform in recent
China Strains to Fit Migrants Into Mainstream Classes, N.Y.

TIMES,

Jan. 25, 2007,

at A3. While the term "migrant" includes both those who have and have not obtained the "legal right" to reside at their point of destination, the term is most
commonly used to denote the latter group. Those whose migrations have been
made "legitimate" by the receipt of household residential status for their point of
destination are beyond the scope of this Comment. As such, the term "'migrant" will
hereafter be used to refer to those who have migrated without having changed
household residential status to their points of destination. See Fang Cai et al., The
Chinese Labor Market, Chapter Prepared for Conference China's Economic Transition: Origins, Mechanisms, and Consequences (Pittsburgh) (Nov. 5-7, 2004) (on
file with author).
8

Beijing Invests Heavily to Improve School Facilitiesfor Migrant Students,
Sept. 6, 2006, available at Factiva.

XINHUA GEN. NEWS SERVICE,

9 French, supra note 7.
10

XINHUA NEWS AGENCY,

supra note 2.
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decades. This underdevelopment has led to increased infringements of
these rights which slow-and in some instances reverse-China's overall
progress towards the rule of law.
The notion that progress towards the rule of law in China may be
slowing or, as this Comment suggests, that the Chinese state may in fact be
retreating from the realization of the rule of law as set forth in the nation's
constitution,11 is by no means obvious. Nor is the notion uncontested. Indeed, the tenor of much academic and political discourse during the past
decade describes with few exceptions steady progress towards the rule of
law in the People's Republic of China (the "PRC"). 12 This present Comment, however, seeks to contest that claim, and argues that China's long
march towards the rule of law has lost ground during past decade.
China's retreat from the rule of law is the result of two inter-related
developments: (1) a dramatic decentralization of state authority which began in 1978 and which continues to the present (the "Reform Era") and (2)
a dumbing-down of the concept of the rule of law. These two developments, taken together, conspire to frustrate China's progress towards the
rule of law in a period of rapid economic development.
Rapid economic development has weakened the central government's ability to enforce the rights enshrined in the nation's constitution
11 See XIANFA [Constitution], art. 5 (1999) (P.R.C.) (providing that China will
build up a socialist country under rule of law).
12

See, e.g., Jamie P. Horsley, The Rule of Law in China: Incremental Progress

94, in C. Fred Bergsten, N. Lardy, B. Gill & D. Mitchell, The Balance Sheet in
2007 and Beyond (Conference held jointly by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Peterson Institute for International Economics, Apr. 2007)
(suggesting that "China is slowly establishing elements of a 'rule of law' system"),
available at http://www.chinabalancesheet.org/Documents/05RuleofLaw.pdf; Randall Peerenboom, What Have we Learned about Law and Development? Describing, Predicting,and Assessing Legal Reforms in China, 27 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 823,
842 (2006); Randall Peerenboom, Law and Development of ConstitutionalDemocracy in China: Problem or Paradigm?, 19 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 185, 187 (2005)
[hereinafter Peerenboom, Law and Development]; Li Buyun, Ideal and Reality of
the Rule of Law in China, 3 J. CHINESE & COMP. L. 40-59 (1997). This Comment is

not alone, however, in challenging the notion that China has made progress towards
the rule of law. "[A] recent report of the World Bank Institute concludes that all
major areas of governance in China, including rule of law, regulatory quality and
accountability, have deteriorated over the last eight years." Xianchu Zhang, Commentary on "Legislatingfor a Market Economy in China," 191

CHINA

Q. 586, 588

(2007) (citing the Report on Governance and Social Policy of the World Bank
Institute, available at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters4.htm).
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and supporting national legislation, such as the right to education. Prior to
the start of economic reform in China, the highly centralized state possessed
near absolute power over local government. Thus it could resolve any deviations from the laws or policies of the central government largely by fiat.
Since the start of the Reform Era, however, the central government has
slowly ceded this control to local governments, private actors, and, increasingly, to market forces without having developed any alternative channels
for the enforcement of its will.
The central government of China began to decentralize the administration and management of public finance in the early years of the Reform
Era as a means of both addressing a chronic underfunding of social institutions, and stimulating economic development.' 3 This decentralization led to
a corresponding weakening of state control over regional and local governments which has seriously undermined the central government's ability to
guarantee compliance with its policies and laws in matters beyond its administrative and managerial reach. This has in turn led to an increase in the
arbitrary and abusive exercise of local power, and consequently to a weakening of the rule of law.
This problem exists across the board-in areas ranging from commercial law, to property law, to family-planning policy-but the problem is
especially acute in areas where the interests of the central government, local
governments, and individual citizens are in conflict. In such instances, the
central government is often limited in its ability to protect the rights and
liberties of individuals from the arbitrary and unlawful actions of local governments, officials, and certain public agents (e.g., school administrators).
This is a problem familiar to many migrant families seeking to access public education for their children. Though the constitution of China and sup13 "In the Third Plenary Session of the 11 th Central Committee of the Communist
Party [December 22, 1978], which marks the historical turning point to reform, it
was decided that 'it is necessary to shift it (the authority) to lower levels so that the
local authorities and industrial and agricultural enterprises will have great power of

decision in management under the guidance of unified state planning . . . '."
Youngjin Jung & Qian Hao, The New Economic Constitution in China: A Third
Way for Competition Regime?, 24 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 107, 123 n.57 (2003),
citing COMMUNIQUI

OF THE THIRD PLENARY SESSION OF THE 11TH CENTRAL COM-

(Adopted on Dec. 22, 1978), available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/5089/5103/index.html. Though
the Session's recommendations were intended primarily to endorse agricultural reforms then underway, this endorsement had broad implications for China's economy and government as well. See also Donald C. Clarke, Legislatingfor a Market
Economy in China, 191 CHINA Q. 567, 569-71 (2007) [hereinafter Market Economy
in China].
MITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA
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porting legislation grant all children the right to a free compulsory public
education, local governments and school administrators are reluctant to admit migrant children to what they perceive as their already overcrowded
and underfunded public schools, and assess prohibitively high fees on these
children in order to give priority to the children of legal residents within
their districts.
The second development contributing to China's weakening rule of
law regime is what this Comment refers to as a "dumbing-down" of rule of
law reform in China. This Comment narrates the process by which China
conceived of the rule of law and used rule of law rhetoric to describe and
later prescribe a reform agenda which privileged economic development
over the individual, political, civil, and human rights recognized by China's
constitution. Chinese and non-Chinese observers alike have long maintained that commercial reforms in China would serve as a wedge for
broader substantive law reform. 14 This notion created the normative expectation first, that economic development should precede civil, social, and
political development, and second, that continued economic development
will inevitably lead to civil, social, and political development. By limiting
the scope of rule of law reform in this way, the central and local governments were excused from having to affirmatively protect individual liberties
at a time when the pace and imperative of economic development increased
private and public incentives to violate these rights. After roughly a decade
of largely instrumental and substantive commercial law reform in China,
the promise of broader substantive reform has yet to materialize, and, in
certain instances, the rule of law is now less secure today than it was ten
years earlier. From this it follows that China's present charted course of
development will not address in time or in turn identifiable failures of the
rule of law, such as the failure to provide migrant children access to public
education.
The problem of education for the children of migrant workers is
both an urgent issue in itself as well as a mirror that reflects, in a microcosm, larger questions of the rule of law and the decentralization of central
authority in China. Migrant children's access to public education has
drawn much attention from the media in recent years, 15 and has also been
the subject of a growing body of academic literature. Thus far, however,

See, e.g., Paul Gewirtz, The U.S.-China Rule of Law Initiative, 11 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 603, 610 (2003) ("[F]rom the very beginning, the Initiative's
14

explicit focus was much broader than commercial law.").
15

See, e.g., French, supra note 7.
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the issue has been left unaddressed by the international legal community. 16
This Comment is intended to both (1) raise awareness within the western
English-speaking legal community of the problem of educational access for
migrant children in China, and (2) challenge the received narrative of
China's ongoing progress towards the rule of law.
This Comment will proceed in two parts. Part I will provide readers
with background on migration, migrant families, and compulsory education
in modem China, while Part II will address more directly the failure of the
rule of law in the PRC during the Reform Era.
I. BACKGROUND: MIGRATION

&

EDUCATION

The rural and urban hemispheres of Chinese society have long been
divided. This divide, however, has become more sharply defined since the
founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949. In the national-development policies of the Communist Party, cultural-historical biases 17 were
formalized, given legal effect, and then reinforced under a nationwide
household registration system (the "hukou system") and a corresponding
system of social entitlements and services. 8 As migration resumed at the
start of the Reform Era in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the historical
rural-urban divide was reconstituted within the urban landscape of a rapidly
industrializing China. Under this system, effective to this day, urban residents enjoy an increased quantity and quality of entitlements and services,
including free access to public schools for their children. This system of
registration and entitlements forms the institutional basis for China's present-day urban bias, 19 and is the key mechanism by which migrants are
A few recent works by legal scholars have mentioned the issue in passing, but
none so far has devoted significant attention to the issue. See Ling Li, Towards a
More Civil Society: Mingong and Expanding Social Space in Reform-era China, 33
16

COLUM. HUm. RTs. L. REV. 149, 167 (2001); Lawrence Cox, Freedom of Religion
in China: Religious, Economic and Social Disenfranchisementfor China'sInternal
Migrant Workers, 8 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 370, 422, 425-27 (2007).
17 For an illustration of the historical and linguistic construction of the "peasant"
in China, see Ling Li, supra note 16, at 167-69.
18 Lei Guang, Reconstituting the Rural-Urban Divide: PeasantMigration and the
Rise of "Orderly Migration" in Contemporary China, 10 J. CONTEMrP. CHINA 471,

493 (2001).
19 Yaohui Zhao, Rural to Urban Labor Migration in China: The Past and the

Present, Paper Presented at the Conference on Economic Research 9 (Beijing)
(May, 16-17, 1997) (on file with author).
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institutionally excluded both from China's cities and developing urban regions at large, 20 and from urban public schools in particular.
Migrant children and the parents or guardians who accompany
them on their sojourns from rural to urban China are a part of what government, academics, and the media commonly refer to as China's "floating
population. '21 Internal migration was virtually non-existent prior to the
start of the Reform Era in the early 1980S, 22 but then surged as China's
economic reforms began to take root and demand for labor increased in the
export-oriented cities along the nation's eastern coast. 23 As a consequence,
the number of migrants has increased rapidly since the onset of the Reform
Era in 1978,24 growing from an estimated population of approximately 7
million in 1982, to more than 20 million a decade later. 25 Since the start of
economic reform in 1978, an estimated 70 to 90 million rural residents have
left China's countryside and moved extra-legally to the townships, villages,
and cities of a fast-developing urban China. 26 Migration to large, coastal
InstitutionalizedExclusion: The Tenuous Legal Status of Internal Migrants in
China's Major Cities (Human Rts. in China, New York, N.Y.), Nov. 6, 2002, at i,
available at http://hrichina.org/public/PDFs/Reports/HRIC-Migrants.pdf [hereinafter Institutionalized Exclusion].
21 Zai Liang & Zhongdong Ma, China's New FloatingPopulation:New Evidence
from the 2000 Census, 30 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 467, 470 (2004). China's
census for the year 2000 defined the floating population as individuals residing at a
destination for six or more months without local household registration status. Id.
22 Xiaogang Wu & Donald J. Treiman, The Household Registration System and
Social Stratification in China: 1955-1996, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 363, 363 (2004).
20

23

Id.

at 365.

Ling Li, supra note 16, at 154.
25 Zai Liang & Zhongdong Ma, supra note 21, at 470.
26 Julia Kwong, Educating Migrant Children: Negotiations Between the State and
Civil Society, 180 CHINA Q. 1073, 1076 (2004); Zai Liang & Zhongdong Ma, supra
note 21, at 472 tbl.1; see also Alan de Brauw & John Giles, Migrant Opportunity
and the Educational Attainment of Youth in Rural China (Inst. for the Study of
Labor, Discussion Paper No. 2326, 2006), at 3-4, available at http://ftp.iza.org/
dp2326.pdf. ("Estimates ...suggest that the inter-county migrant population grew
from just over 20 million in 1990 to 45 million in 1995 and 79 million by 2000.")
(citations excluded). "Official migrations," resulting largely from marriages and
from job-placements for college graduates, have been estimated to number between
16 and 20 million each year. Fang Cai et al., supra note 7, at 17-18; see also
Dwayne Benjamin et al., Income Inequality During China's Economic Transition,
in CHINA'S ECONOMIC TRANSITION: ORIGINS, MECHANISMS, AND CONSEQUENCES 2,
2 (Loren Brandt & Thomas Rawski eds.) (forthcoming), available at www.msu.
edu/-gilesj/BBGW.pdf (describing the reclassification of "rural" areas as "urban").
24
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metropolises such as Beijing has been especially robust, particularly from
the early-1980s to the mid-1990s. 2 7 Current estimates place the number of
28
migrants in Beijing at 3 million or more in a city of 14 million.
While the total number of new migrants appears to have peaked in
the mid-1990s, 29 the composition of the migrant demographic has undergone substantial change in recent years. 30 This change poses a new series
of problems for national, provincial and local governments even as they
struggle to manage the first wave of migrations begun more than a decade
earlier.
Though China's migrating masses were initially composed largely
of rural men, the number of women migrating increased rapidly during the
early Reform Era, and women now constitute a significant if not greater
proportion of the rural-born migrant population in some areas.31 Consequently, over this period, as the nation's first wave of rural migrants settled
into cities throughout China, "migrant families" began to emerge.3 2 In
This reclassification may lead researchers to underestimate the number of rural
migrants present in China's cities, as sojourners from agricultural areas reclassified
as "urban" may be mistakenly identified as intra-urban migrants. Id.
27 Xin Frank He, Regulating Rural-UrbanMigrants in Beijing: Institutional Conflict and Ineffective Campaigns, 39 STAN. J. INT'L L. 177, 186 (2003). There are
indications that the pace of migration has slowed in recent years. See, e.g., Institutionalized Exclusion, supra note 20, at iii.
28 Kwong, supra note 26, at 1076. See also Han Jialing, Survey Report on the
State of Compulsory Education Among Migrant Children in Beijing, 37 CHINESE
EDUC. & Soc'Y. 29, 29 (2004); and Zai Liang & Zhongdong Ma, supra note 21, at
472 tbl. 1.
29 InstitutionalizedExclusion, supra note 20, at ii-iii.
30 See, e.g., Kwong, supra note 26, at 1076 ("Rural migrants are young and not
highly educated with about half receiving some high school education .... A 2002
survey showed that the average age of the migrant population in Beijing has risen
from 20 to 30 years old in the last decade; many have married and established
families, and preferred to live in the city.").
31
See Tamara Jacka & Arianne M. Gaetano, Introduction: Focusing on Migrant
Women, in ON THE MOVE: WOMEN AND RURAL-TO-URBAN MIGRATION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 1, 21-23 (Arianne M. Gaetano & Tamara Jacka eds., 2004). The
authors note that "[t]he proportion of women among the floating population has
been found to vary a great deal, with conditions in certain areas seemingly favoring
women's migration." Id. at 21. Women migrants constitute a significant proportion
of all migrant in several parts of China, but most notably in the export-oriented
consumer non-durable manufacturing cities of the Pearl River Delta, opposite Hong
Kong. See id. at 21-23.
32 Han Jialing, supra note 28, at 30.
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more recent years, "left-behind" spouses, children, and extended kin began
to join their rural-born migrant family members in their host cities, leading
to a significant increase overall in the number of migrants in China's urban
areas,3 3 and perhaps more significantly still, leading to a rapid increase in
the number of migrant children present in the urban-receiving areas. The
number of migrant families has also been increasing since the mid- to late35
1990s3 4 and is projected to grow yet in the years to come.
This mass rural-to-urban migration has been described as "the most
salient socioeconomic development in China. '3 6 And no wonder. These
migrants are integral to the rapid development of urban China,3 7 and to the
nation's economy as a whole,3 8 contributing the low-cost labor fueling
much of the country's rapid economic growth.3 9 Nonetheless, in spite of
the important role migrants have played and will continue to play in
China's ongoing economic transformation, urban-receiving areas such as
Beijing often deny migrants access to even the most basic of social services,
including access to "public" compulsory education facilities for their children, 40 in violation of Chinese law.
These violations have increased in recent years in spite of China's
recent economic progress. This seeming paradox can be traced to two simultaneous and overlapping developments, that is both (1) the decentralization of the Chinese state, and (2) the dumbing-down of the rule of law.
Decentralization has shifted the burden of financing and managing public
Ingrid Nielsen et al., Determinants of School Attendance Among Migrant Children: Survey Evidence from China's Jiangsu Province (Monash University Dep't
of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 65/05, 2005), at 2, available at www.buseco.
monash.edu.au/mgt/research/working-papers/2005/wp65-05.pdf.
34 Lu Shaoqing & Zhang Shouli, Urban/Rural Disparity and Migrant Children's
Education, 37 CHINESE EDUC. & Soc'y 56, 58-59 (2004).
35 Id. at 65.
36 Han Jialing, supra note 28, at 29.
37 Meihua Zhu, The Education Problems of Migrant Children in Shanghai, 80
33

CHILD WELFARE

563, 564 (2001).

Nielsen et al., supra note 33, at 2.
39 See, e.g., Ingrid Nielsen et al., supra note 33, at 2; Dorothy J. Solinger, China's
Floating Population: Implications for State and Society, inTHE PARADOX OF
38

CHINA'S POST-MAo REFORMS

220, 225 (Merle Goldman & Roderick MacFarquhar

eds., 1999); and Lu Shaoqing & Zhang Shouli, supra note 34, at 58.
40 See, e.g., Xiang Biao, How Far are the Left-Behind Left Behind? A Preliminary
Study in Rural China (Oxford University Centre on Migration, Policy and Society,
Working Paper No. 12, 2005) at 7, available at http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/publications/Working%20papers/Xiang%2OBiao%20WP0512.pdf.
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education from the central government to the local governments. This, in
turn, creates the incentive for local governments, schools, and their staff to
abuse their control over migrant access to public education, while the central government's ability to protect individuals from abuses of this sort has
weakened. This dumbed-down rule of law creates the false impression that
individual, political, civil, and human rights are being-or will in due time
be-adequately provided for, when in fact, evidence suggests that these
crucial dimensions of Chinese law and society are subject to frequent and
increasing abuses by government and individuals. This ensures the present
course of law reform will perpetuate the continued underdevelopment of
these rights rather than the realization of the rule of law.
The question of education for migrant children is an urgent issue
for urban China. In order to provide the reader with the background necessary for later discussions of migrant access to education, the following
pages describe the historical bases of China's rural-urban dichotomy, the
patterns of migration and of migration control in the early decades of the
People's Republic, as well as changes in migration which occurred during
the Reform Era.

2008
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4
Migration Trends and Statistics '

Migration was not restricted in earliest days of the People's Republic.42 In an effort to promote industrial development in the years immediately after the founding of the PRC, rural residents were encouraged to
migrate to centers of production, and millions of peasants were recruited by
industrial enterprises during the first Five-Year Plan (1953-1957). 4 3 However, the wisdom of this policy was not universally accepted within the
ranks of the Party elite. Many prominent officials believed extensive and
unrestricted migration would undermine the nation's efforts then underway
to construct a New China, the keystone of which was to be an urban welfare
system. As such, a household registration system was developed in the
mid-1950s" as a means of consolidating administrative control over the
Data relating to internal migration and education attainments are notoriously
unreliable and estimates of the number of migrants and of children excluded from
the compulsory education system of China vary widely. The precise number of
migrants is difficult if not impossible to state with any degree of certainty. See Fang
Cai et. al., supra note 26, at 17-18. One reason for the variations is the
indeterminacy of the term "migrant" in the available literature as well as in the
various surveys conducted by government and independent researchers both
domestic and international. See Id. (stating that the definition of migration may
vary 'with respect the geographic scope, the time duration of residence outside
one's home, and whether the migration was accompanied by a change in hukou or
not"); see also Dwayne Benjamin et al., supra note 26, at 2 (discussing the
reclassification of essentially "rural" areas as "urban" in recent years). Another
reason is that the data appears to have been subject to political manipulation. See,
e.g., Yongshun Cai, Between State and Peasant: Local Cadres and Statistical
Reporting in Rural China, 163 CHINA Q. 783 (2000) (reporting that statistical
manipulation occurs from the village level upwards to provincial levels). Yet
another reason, is that the itinerant lifestyles that many migrants and their families
are forced to adopt make them difficult to track over time. See, e.g., William
Lavely, First Impressionsfrom the 2000 Census of China, 27 POPULATION & DEV.
REv. 755, 756-57 (2001) (detailing the difficulties faced by China's census bureau
attempting to obtain accurate information on internal migrants). However, while
the precise numbers of migrants, migrant families, and migrant children enrolled in
and excluded from the compulsory education system may vary from study to study,
the approximate scale of the issue-and thus its urgency-is readily apparent in
even the most conservative of estimates.
42 Han Jialing, supra note 28, at 54 n.5.
41 Xiaogang Wu & Treiman, supra note 22, at 364.
44 Xiaogang Wu & Treiman, supra note 22, at 363. The household registration
system "evolved out of unique historical conditions." Id. at 30. The system was
influenced by both the ancient Chinese baojia system of registration, and by the
41
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domestic population. 45 The registration system was formally administered
by the Public Security Bureau (the "PSB"), 46 supplemented by additional
administrative controls as well as formal and non-formal monitoring by the
communes, for rural residents, and work-units ("danwei") for non-rural
populations. 47 This two-tiered (formal and non-formal) administrative
structure played an integral role in the later enforcement of migration controls, discussed below.
When the household registration system was formally established
in 1958, 4 8 it divided the country's population into various categories depending on one's place of registration, and the "type" of registration, which
was designated as either agricultural or non-agricultural (i.e., rural or urban). 49 This enabled authorities to monitor local populations initially, and
later to control-or more precisely, to reverse-migration during the late
"internal passport" or propiska systems of the former Soviet Union and other socialist states. Lei Guang, supra note 18, at 479; Kam Wing Chan & Li Zhan, The
Hukou System and Rural-UrbanMigration in China: Processes and Changes, 160
CHINA Q. 818, 821 (1999); Linda Wong & Huen Wai-Po, Reforming the Household
Registration System: A Preliminary Glimpse of the Blue Chop Household Registration System in Shanghai and Shenzhen, 32 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 974, 974 (1998).
Indeed, the household registration system, once implemented in the early years of
the PRC functioned much like present-day international passport systems. Kam
Wing Chan & Li Zhan, supra, at 830; InstitutionalizedExclusion, supra note 20, at
iii.
45 Xiaogang Wu & Treiman, supra note 22, at 364.
46 See Fei-Ling Wang, Reformed Migration Control and New Targeted People:
China's hukou System in the 2000s, 177 CHINA Q. 115, 117 (2004); and Yaohui
Zhao, supra note 19 (describing the PSB's role in the administration of the system).
47 Xiaogang Wu & Treiman, supra note 22, at 364; see also Institutionalized Exclusion, supra note 20, at 9; Kam Wing Chan & Li Zhang, supra note 44, at 829-30
(describing enforcement and monitoring under the household registration system);
Solinger, supra note 39, at 221 (describing "non-formal" monitoring conducted at
the community level).
48 Institutionalized Exclusion, supra note 20, at 8. For an explanation of the legal
basis of the household registration system, see Fei-Ling Wang, supra note 46, at
117, 130; China's Household Registration System: Sustained Reform Needed to
Protect China's Rural Migrants, http://www.cecc.gov/pages/news/hukou.php (last
visited Mar. 31, 2008) [hereinafter China's Household Registration System]; Institutionalized Exclusion, supra note 20, at n.18. For a recapitulation of the early
history of the household registration, see Lei Guang, supra note 18, at 480-81; Kam
Wing Chan & Li Zhan, supra note 44, at 819-20; Solinger, supra note 39, at 221.
49 Lei Guang, supra note 18, at 479-80; Kam Wing Chan & Li Zhan, supra note
44, at 821-22.

2008

MIGRANT CHILDREN

1950s and early 1960s. At this time, after the disastrous Great Leap Forward (1958-1960) and the resulting onset of a three-year famine in the early
1960s,50 migration controls implicit in the household registration system
were strictly enforced by the PSB,5 1 resulting in the forced return of approx52
imately 18 million urban workers to their rural homes.
Migration restrictions, once imposed, were immediately effective.
Yet, the formal registration requirements of the PSB-implemented hukou
system did not by themselves restrict migration. Rather, "the hukou system
worked with other mechanisms to form multi-layered structure of control
with each single institution controlling one or more aspects of rural-urban
53
migration; they were interrelated and complementary to each other."
These mechanisms included: manpower planning, which eliminated the private market for labor; grain policy, which eliminated the private market for
foodstuffs; and the household registration system. 54 Taken together, these
three mechanisms constituted a system of entitlements to which citizens
could only gain access in their places of residence.
Once migration restrictions were strictly enforced, the need to access this system of entitlements compelled those who had migrated in the
early years of the PRC to return to their places of official residence, and
deterred others from migrating.5 5 Among these entitlements, the rationing
system was perhaps the most effective means of enforcing migration restrictions. 56 The rural-urban dichotomy, created in part and enforced by the
hukou system, is thus composed of both a status bifurcation5 7 and a differXiaogang Wu & Treiman, supra note 22, at 364.
Kam Wing Chan & Li Zhan, supra note 44, at 828-29.
52 Xiaogang Wu & Treiman, supra note 22, at 364. This move was part of a
broader consolidation of authority in national government underway at that time.
Id.
53 Kam Wing Chan & Li Zhan, supra note 44, at 830.
54 Lei Guang, supra note 18, at 474.
55 Lei Guang, supra note 18, at 481.
56 See Kam Wing Chan & Li Zhan, supra note 44, at 822.
57 Household registration status was initially matrilineal, and for the majority of
China's citizens was an ascribed rather than an earned status. InstitutionalizedExclusion, supra note 20, at 9 n.19. Household registration status became inheritable
from either parent in 1998. Id.; see also Kam Wing Chan & Li Zhan, supra note 44,
at 822; U.N. Convention on the Rts. of the Child, Comm. on the Rts. of the Child,
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 44 of the Convention, Second Periodic Report of States Parties Due in 1997, China, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/83/Add.9, 53 (2005) [hereinafter Second Periodic Report]; Xiaogang Wu
& Treiman, supra note 22, at 365.
50
51
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entiation of real entitlements.58 These "essential features" of the hukou
have remained unchanged through the years despite changes in the social,
political, and economic fabric of China. 59
Migration, and with it, urban population growth did not resume in
any real measure until the beginning of the Reform Era in 1978,60 at which
time economic reform began to dramatically redefine long-prevailing social
and political institutions, including "urban citizenship." 6' With the institution of urban citizenship under siege, the rural-urban dichotomy, once rigidly defined, began to break down and rural residents began to migrate
towards coastal urban areas via the small towns and cities which surrounded
rural China.

62

Early economic reform 63 stimulated demand in urban areas for lowskill labor that China's rural residents were well-positioned and eager to
provide. 64 This led both to a relaxation of administrative controls 65 and to a
consequent breakdown the state's ability to enforce its (anti-)migration policies. 66 The ready availability of low-cost labor in turn led to dramatic inWong & Huen Wai-Po, supra note 44, at 975.
59 John E. Ingulsrud & Kate Allen, FirstSteps to Literacy in Chinese Classrooms,
5 CURRENT ISSUES IN COMP. ED. 103, 112 (2003). But see Wong & Wai-Po, supra
note 44, at 974 (arguing that the household registration system serves many functions in the present day).
60 Ling Li, supra note 16, at 154; see also R. Yin-Wang Kwok, Urbanization
under Economic Reform, in URBANIZING CHINA 65, 65-66 (Gregory Eliyu Guldin
ed.) (1992).
61 Solinger, supra note 39, at 220.
62 Id. at 223.
63 This consisted in (1) the termination of the communes in the countryside, (2)
the implementation of a pro-coastal developmental strategy, (3) the promotion and
rapid development profit-consciousness in urban firms, and (4) the creation of urban labor markets. See Id. at 225.
64 Id. at 226.
65 These included the danwei, which had consisted in rationing, and the commune
system, which had consisted in direct control over labor for agricultural production.
Xiaogang Wu & Treiman, supra note 22, at 364-65.
66 Id. at 364-65. Several factors contributed to this breakdown. Three developments in particular were instrumental in the reemergence of migration in the early
Reform Era, namely (1) the increased agricultural production and the marketization
of food, (2) the development and subsequent decline of rural Township-Village
Enterprises ("TVEs"), and (3) the emergence and continued development of a labor
market. Introduction of the household responsibility system ("HRS") increased agricultural productivity which in turn both led to the creation of surplus labor and
provided the basis for the marketization of foodstuffs. Fang Cai et. al., supra note
58
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creases in foreign direct investment ("FDI") in China's coastal provinces67
and cities during this period, which further stimulated economic growth.
Formal changes in migration policy, however, trailed events on the
ground by several years. In fact,"it took until April 1983, with rural reform
attained nationwide, for central politicians to begin to relent on the policy

7, at 3-4; Fang Cai Fang & Dewen Wang Dewen, Migration as Marketization:
What Can We Learn from China's 2000 Census Data?, 3 CHINA REV. 73, 74
(2003); Yaohui Zhao, supra note 19, at 10. As a consequence, "grain output increased by 40-50 percent between 1979 and 1983." Id. at 10. This development
greatly facilitated the subsistence of rural residents in urban areas. See Kwong,
supra note 26, at 1075. A third part of this new economic policy was the development and subsequent decline of rural Township-Village Enterprises. These enterprises enjoyed great success in the early years of reform and were able to absorb
much of the surplus rural labor-created by the introduction of the household responsibility system-then migrating outward from China's interior, but began to
decline during the second decade of reform in the 1990s. JEAN C. OI, RURAL CHINA
TAKES OFF: INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC REFORM 11 (1999); see
also Yaohui Zhao, supra note 19, at 11-12 ("[B]etween 1984 and 1988, rural enterprises provided an average of 10.8 million new jobs per year. However, the growth
rate of nonfarm employment decreased to about half that number for 1988-1994.").
Their decline, consequently and perhaps somewhat causally coincided with a surge
in the number of urban-bound migrants. Ling Li, supra note 16, at 180; see also
Zai Liang & Michael J. White, Market Transition, Government Policies and Interprovincial Migration in China: 1983-1988, 45 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE
321, 334-36 (1997). Surplus rural labor gave rise to labor markets, a significant
change in a centrally-planned economy. And thus a second part was the relaxation
of labor policy and the emergence, consequently, of a labor market. Fang Cai et al.,
supra note 7, at 1. Massive urban development and a consequent need for labor,
particularly in the construction industry, "pulled" migrants from the countryside.
Yaohui Zhao, supra note 19, at 11. Capital construction in the major municipalities
of Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai, for example, increased by more than two-fold
during the 1980s while urban-based labor forces in these cities increased a mere 9
to 10% in that same period. Solinger, supra note 39, at 226. The inability of such
rapidly developing urban areas to provide for their own labor needs was and continues to be a powerful driving force behind the migration of rural residents to city
and coastal areas. See also Cai Fang & Wang Dewen, supra, at 74 ("The higher
returns to labour in non-agricultural sectors motivated farmers to migrate out of
agriculture.").
67 See, e.g., Zai Liang & White, supra note 66, at 334-36 (1997); Julia Ya Qin,
Trade, Investment and Beyond: The Impact of WTO Accession on China's Legal
System, 191 CHINA Q. 720, 721 (2007).
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on migration." 68 Urban population growth, which had remained stagnant
during much of the pre-Reform Era, resumed largely as a result of rural out-

migration.
Within a decade-between 1978, the start of the Reform Era, and
1987-more than 10 million rural residents found urban employment
through legal procedures, 69 while the number of rural residents migrating
non-formally or extra-legally is estimated to be much higher.70 The proportion of those employed in urban areas increased from 24 to 34 percent between the early years of reform. 7 1 Today, the total number of migrantsincluding those who have obtained local household residential status-is
72
believed to exceed 130 million.
Though China as a nation made great economic progress in the Reform Era as measured by yearly increases in gross domestic product
("GDP"), the nation's economic success has not been equally shared among

68

Solinger, supra note 39, at 223. "The State Council's 'Regulations Concerning

Cooperative Endeavors of City and Town Laborers' was the first to permit rural
residents to move into market towns, albeit without shedding their rural registrations. Once there, unlike the towns' 'proper residents,' they would have to rely not
on the state's grain rations but on food they had brought in themselves." Id. Under
the "small cities" migration policy, peasants were allowed to "leave the land but
not the village," ("litu bu liiiang") and to "leave the village without entering the
city" ("lixiang bu jincheng"). Wong & Wai-Po, supra note 44, at 975. For a detailed account of the rise and decline of the "small-towns" policy, see Wong &
Wai-Po, supra note 44, at 975-76. The central government appears to be patterning
hukou reform on its earlier "small-towns" policy, relaxing requirements for the urban hukou in 20,000 smaller towns and cities throughout the country. Xiang Biao,
supra note 40, at 24 n.10. The "self-supplied grain" hukou was introduced in 1984.
China's Household Registration System, supra note 48, at 3. The self-supplied
grain hukou was later abolished in the early 1990s. Kam Wing Chan & Li Zhan,
supra note 44, at 835-36. Other formal restrictions were greatly relaxed during this
period as well. For a detailed description of changes in hukou policies in the Reform Era, see Kam Wing Chan & Li Zhan, supra note 44, at 831-48. See also
Wong & Wai-Po, supra note 44, at 975-77, describing six substantial policy development in the 1980s and 1990s. These early changes in migration policy were
aimed at limiting the growth of large cities, while promoting the growth of small
and medium sized cities. "As a result, until the late 1980s, China's rate of urban
growth was much slower than that of most developing countries." Ling Li, supra
note 16, at 155.
69 Solinger, supra note 39, at 224.
70

Solinger, supra note 39, at 234.

71

Fang Cai et al., supra note 7, at 1.

72

Fang Cai et al., supra note 7, at 18.
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the population. 73 Whereas pre-reform Chinese society was characterized by
a general homogeneity of socio-economic status, inequality has risen
sharply in post-reform China. 74 The continued administration of the household registration system and its corresponding system of entitlements in the
period of resurgent migration has led to a stark stratification of income and
opportunity in present day China.75 As a consequence, a new social hierarchy has emerged in the PRC. From the bottom, this hierarchy is composed
of unregistered peasant migrants, temporary urban residents, and "true" urban residents. 76 Rural-urban income differences are greater presently than
at the start of the Reform Era, and appear yet to be on the rise. In 2002, per
capita rural income was a mere 36 percent of per capita urban income, an
income disparity far greater than is typically found in other developing
countries within the region. 77 This inequality worsens by the year-China's
present course of development, if continued, is not likely to redress the
disenfranchisement of the nation's swelling underclass. China's worsening
state of social and economic inequality is perhaps nowhere more keenly
illustrated than in the primary and secondary schools of the nation's capital.
See Randall Peerenboom, Law and Development of ConstitutionalDemocracy
in China: Problem or Paradigm?, 19 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 185, 210 (2005) (citations omitted) [hereinafter Peerenboom, Law and Development].
There is wide regional variation and a growing income gap. The eastern coastal
region is much wealthier than the rest of the country, and rural areas are poorer
than cities, although the number of poor urbanites has also grown dramatically.
According to the UNDP, in 1998, the share of national income or consumption of
the poorest 10% was 2.4%, and 5.9% for the poorest 20%, whereas the share of the
richest 20% was 46.6%, and 30.4% for the richest 10%. By 2003, the share of the
top 20% had risen to 51%. Meanwhile, 16% live on less than US$1 per day, while
4.6% live below the national poverty line. One-fourth of the population, or over
300 million people, lack sustained access to an adequate water source.
14 Benjamin et al., supra note 26, at 32. For an overview of economic indicators
showing evidence of an increasing rural-urban divide in the reform era, see Institutionalized Exclusion, supra note 20, at 13-17.
" Kam Wing Chan & Li Zhan, supra note 44, at 843. "Although it is not surprising that rural origin leads to disadvantages in socioeconomic achievement.., rural
hukou status imposed additional limitations on favorable life chances in China,
which cannot be attributed solely to the effect of place." Xiaogang Wu & Treiman,
supra note 22, at 369.
76 Kam Wing Chan & Li Zhan, supra note 44, at 843.
73

Fang Cai et al., supra note 7, at 20. See also InstitutionalizedExclusion, supra
note 20, at 14 for additional discussion of rural-urban income inequality using
figures from the State Statistical Bureau of China.
77
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The next section will address specific institutional barriers faced by
migrants attempting to access public education.
B. Education and Equality: An Overview of Education in China During
the Reform Era
Education has been identified as an important means by which socioeconomic inequality may potentially be addressed. In China, however,
law and economics conspire to foreclose from migrant children this potential remedy. China's present course of law reform fails to guarantee migrant
children their legal right of access to public schooling. By denying these
children the opportunity to avail themselves of a basic education, China
severely curtails their prospects for socioeconomic advancement and personal betterment, and thereby prevents migrant children and their families
from sharing-or rather, from attempting to share fairly-in the growing
prosperity of the People's Republic.
In 1985, China reformed its educational system as part of a larger
program to decentralize the finance and management of public and social
services.78 In the years since, responsibility for education has devolved to
local levels ostensibly to increase financial contributions at the sub-national
79
level.
Before the reform, China had a centralized public-finance system,
characterized by the practice of tong shou tong zhi (complete collection and
complete distribution) according to which a lower-level government submitted all its tax revenues to a higher-level government and received all its
expenditures from the higher-level government. In 1982, the practice of
feng zou chi fang (eating from separate pots) was introduced by which a
80
government at each level was responsible for its own finances.
This approach greatly exacerbates educational inequality and, by
extension, social inequality. 8' As a result, absolute expenditures on educaThe financial reform of education is composed of two elements: the decentralization and the diversification of revenue sources. Mun C. Tsang, Education and
National Development in China Since 1949: Oscillating Policies and Enduring Dilemmas 12-13, available at http://www.teacherscollege.edu/centers/coce/pdf-files!
dl .pdf.
79 Second Periodic Report, supra note 57,
233.
80 Tsang, supra note 78, at 13.
The problem, international researchers have noted, is "decentralized financing
81
of basic education without adequate equalization transfers." U.N. Econ. & Soc.
Council [ECOSOC], Commission on Human Rights, The Right to Education, Report, Addendum, Mission to the People's Republic of China, 10-19 September
78
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tion increased substantially during the Reform Era, though spending as a
2
proportion of GDP remained fairly flat.
True to the central government's design, the bulk of this increase
came from local governments. "China's official statistics for 2000 have
shown that merely 53 per cent of funding for education was public, and out
of that merely 8 per cent came from the central Government and only 2
percent went to compulsory education. ' 83 Thus while central government
expenditures on education appear to have increased8 4 during the 1980s and
1990s, extra-budgetary expenditures derived from local sources increased at
a much faster rate. 85 Local governments contribution, in turn, were largely
financed by families in the form of increased school fees and, where applicable, tuition.
As the government shouldered a decreasing proportion of the overall cost of compulsory education during the 1990s, the financial reform burden borne by families in the form of "hidden" fees and various other
educational surcharges increased at an alarming rate. 86 This now substantial
private cost of public education inhibits access to schooling for China's
poor and has been cited as the most important reason for non-attendance
2003, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/45/Add.1, at 1 10 (Nov. 2003) [hereinafter U.N.
Econ. & Soc. Council].
82 During the Ninth 5-Year Plan, education spending increased by 15.43 percent
annually, faster than the national economy. Total spending on education by financial administrations throughout the country as a proportion of GDP has grown constantly, increasing from 2.41 percent in 1995 to 2.87 percent in 2000. Total
spending on education in 2000 was double that of 1995. Second Periodic Report,
supra note 57,
230.
12.
83 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, supra note 81,
84 The precise amount allocated by the government to education is subject to dispute. As a percentage of GDP, government expenditures on education actually declined between 1991 and 1997, falling from 2.86 percent to 2.48 percent. See
Tsang, supra note 78, at 14. Central government expenditures then rebounded
through five years of consecutive increases to 3.41 percent in 2002, according to
official Chinese sources. See Randall Peerenboom, Assessing Human Rights in
China: Why the Double Standard?, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 71, 120 (2005) [hereinafter Peerenboom, Assessing Human Rights]. UNDP research, by contrast, suggests
that expenditures amounted to a mere 2.1 percent of GDP between 1998 and 2000.
See id. at 120. Government expenditures on education remain low as compared
with other developing nations, and remains inadequate to provide for a growing
number of migrant children.
85 Tsang, supra note 78, at 14.
86 Tsang, supra note 78, at 12-13.
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among children from economically disadvantaged households. 87 This situation has worsened in recent years despite China's rapid economic growth.
China's Compulsory Education Law requires government funding
for compulsory education in order to prevent the charging of fees.88 When
funding is not forthcoming or otherwise insufficient, local governments,
which are prohibited from raising revenue through taxation, resort to the
assessing of fees as means of covering the costs of schooling. 89 Fees assessed to migrant children-who were traditionally barred from accessing
"public" schools in areas outside their official place of residence 9 0-are on
See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, supra note 81, at 3; Daniel Fu Keung Wong et
al., Rural Migrant Workers in Urban China: Living a MarginalisedLife, 16 INT'L.
J. Soc. WELFARE 32, 35-36 (2007).
88 See infra Part II.B, THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION, (summarizing China's Compulsory Education Law). In spite of the law's provisions, compulsory education in
Reform-Era China has never been free, and contributions from families in the form
of fees other surcharges have continued to rise in recent years.
18. The fact that one clearly
89 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, supra note 81,
proscribed local government act-the assessing of school fees-is essentially permitted while another proscribed act-the raising of revenues by local government
through general taxation-is not resorted to raises an interesting question about the
central and local government's respective priorities and their commitments to providing free compulsory education. A more cynical observer might legitimately argue that the central government's continued regulation rather than an outright
prohibition and abolition of the charging of fees for access to compulsory education
evinces its acquiescence to the practice. See, e.g., Katarina Tomasevski, Globalizing What: Education as a Human Right or as a Traded Service?, 12 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STD. 1, 45-46 (2005).
90 Migrant children are denied access to public schools even where, as in Beijing,
excess capacity exists. The injustice of this practice may be particularly acute for
those children born to urban areas whose official residence is based on their parents' rural residency. In a recent study migrant children in Beijing, the author found
that many of the children surveyed had been born and/or raised in the capital and
were therefore "Beijingers" in all but name.
87

Some 5 percent of the migrant children and juveniles (eight
to seventeen years old) surveyed were born in Beijing, and
among them, 17.7 percent had been to school in Beijing for
five years. About 36.1 percent had come to Beijing five years
ago. Many children spent their childhood in Beijing, and some
could not tell where they originally came from. Some 10 percent
believed they were Beijingers, although they did not have
Beijing residence registrations and many had spent their childhood in Beijing's vegetable plots, trash dumps, and jerrybuilt
schools.
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91
average much higher than those paid by non-migrant children. These fees,
moreover, are increasing in both size and frequency.
The rapid increase in the number of migrant children present in
China's urban areas beginning in the mid- to late-1990s revealed the deficiencies of the state's ongoing decentralization of the finance and management of compulsory education. The monies allocated by the central
government to localities for compulsory education are distributed in proportion to the number of permanent resident children within a given area rather
than the number of children expected to enroll in public schooling. Migrant
children, ipso facto, were not and are not today "urban residents" in the
eyes of government both national and local. They are not, as such, included
in population surveys for areas in which they reside. Local governments
and individual schools receive no state funding for migrant children, and
view such children as a burden to their already strained finances.
In cities, the district government (the lowest level of urban government) and municipality government are responsible for primary (age 6-11)
and secondary education (12-17), respectively. Budget allocation is strictly
based on the assumption that public education is for the hukou population
only. Although it is self-evident that migrant parents are contributing to the
local revenue, local government could argue that serving the migrants
92
would violate the budget regulation.

Consequently, schools failing to provide free access to migrant children frequently cite inadequate funding as the principal reason they assess
student fees. 93
Han Jialing, supra note 28, at 51.
91 "In the late 1990s, parents paid an average of 300 to 400 yuan a term for miscellaneous fees to keep their children in school." Kwong, supra note 26, at 1077.
"Besides the 300 to 400 yuan paid by the local students each term, migrant parents
must pay an additional 480 yuan education rental fee (fie du fei), a 2,000 yuan
education compensation payment (jiaoyu buchang fei) and a 1,000 yuan school
choice fee (ze xiao fei). Prestigious public schools can demand over 10,000 yuan
and some as high as 230,000 yuan school choice fee from parents." Id. at 1078.
92 Xiang Biao, supra note 40, at 7.
9 See, e.g., Nielsen et al., supra note 33, at 3:
In Beijing, migrant children schools charge about 300 RMB ($US
36) per term. If migrant children go to public schools their parents have to pay 500 RMB ($US 60) in fees per term, plus various other charges including 1000 RMB ($US 120) for selection
of the school and between 1000 RMB and 30,000 RMB ($US
3615) as sponsorship. To put this in context, a 2002 survey found
that the monthly income of migrant households in Beijing aver-

230

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 14

In response to their children's de facto exclusion from public education, migrant communities began to set up their own schools in large urban areas throughout China during the early 1990s as a means of providing
for their children's education. 94 These schools operated extra-legally for
years until the central government began to experiment with allowing unlicensed schools during the mid- to late-1990s. 95 Migrant schools have faced
a number of challenges in recent years but play an integral role in providing
migrant children with access to basic education. 96 For example, in 1995,
whereas nearly 100 percent of Beijing's urban-native children aged 5 to 12
years were enrolled in schools, only 40 percent of migrant children were. 97
Recent surveys of migrant children in Beijing meanwhile suggest than enrollment rates had been approaching-and may in fact have exceeded-90
percent, with a significant proportion of those children enrolled in migrant

ages around 1000 RMB with 20 per cent of migrant households
earning less than 500 RMB per month and 43 per cent of households earning between 500 RMB and 1000 RMB per month (People's Daily, 2004).
See also Han Jialing, supra note 28, at 36, for a discussion of fees assessed to
migrant children in Beijing; and Lu Shaoqing & Zhang Shouli, supra note 34, at 75
tbl.9 for comparison of tuition at public and migrant schools.
94 Xiang Biao, supra note 40, at 7.
95 Nielsen et al., supra note 33, at 3. These experiments included the "Trial Measures for the Schooling of Children and Youth Among the Floating Population in
Cities and Towns" issued by the State Education Commission in April 1996, a

summary of which is outlined in the

LEGAL DAILY,

June 7, 1996, p.2; and the

"Temporary Measures for the Schooling of Children and Adolescents from the Migrating Population" published jointly by the State Commission for Education and
the Ministry for Public Security in 1998. Chloe Froissart, The Hazards of the Right
to an Education:A Study of the Schooling of Migrant Worker Children in Chengdu,
48 CHINA PERSPECTIVES 21, 22 (2003). See also Han Jialing, supra note 28, at 33
for a discussion of the impact that various measures enacted in the late 1990s had
on migrant schooling. There exists a great number of national and local regulations
on the schooling of migrant children and the operation of schools intended to serve
them. The above measures are cited not as definitive legal authorities, but rather to
show that governments at various levels are aware of the problem, and to suggest
that such measures have been thus far ineffective at resolving the issue. Moreover,
implementation of these regulations has varied from locality to locality. Many local
governments failed to comply with the orders. See, e.g., Nielsen et al., supra note
33, at 3.
96 Han Jialing, supra note 28, at 32.
97

Solinger, supra note 39, at 236.
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schools, 98 prior to the recent crackdown on migrant during the summer of
2006. In spite of central and local government efforts to promote the legitimization of migrant schools, legal approval has eluded the vast majority of
such schools, 99 most of which remain unlicensed to the present day.
Such schools, however, even when licensed by local governments,
are generally inferior in quality to their urban-based "public" counterpart
institutions. Their promotion, moreover, perpetuates a two-tiered system of
education which is, on its face, inconsistent with the central government's
desire to promote free access to public schooling for all the nation's children. 100 Recognizing this fact, local governments recently have been closing down migrant schools, further marginalizing migrant children in the
marketized education system of the present day. Whereas such closings
occurred somewhat frequently in the past, the number of closings appears to
have increased in recent years, reaching a high of more than 200 in the
summer and autumn of 2006.101
This suggests the rising tide of China's economic growth, which
has lifted many a boat in the past three decades, has capsized many others.
A continuation of the nation's present course of economic development and
law reform is not likely to benefit the institutionally excluded migrant child,
but will rather lead to the continued exclusion of such children from mainstream society.
The Chinese state and society have atomized. Economic policies
implemented during the Reform Era were accompanied by a decentraliza98

Han Jialing, supra note 28, at 35.

99 For an illustration of the obstacles to legal recognition faced by migrant
schools, see Froissart, supra note 95, at 26-30.
100 See, e.g., Lu Shaoqing & Zhang Shouli, supra note 34, at 79, stating that
"[m]igrant children are excluded from the urban and rural educational systems and
can obtain basic education only from private offerings in the market. There are,
however, grave deficiencies in the supply of, and the demand (ability to pay) for,
marketized education. All these developments undermine the rights of the migrant
children to receive education. The migrant children's educational situation duplicates the unequal relationship between China's urban and rural areas and undermines the principle of compulsory, equal, and comprehensive education." See also
Shutting Out the Poorest: DiscriminationAgainst the Most DisadvantagedMigrant
Children in City Schools (Human Rights in China, New York, N.Y.), May 8, 2002,
at 13, available at http://www.hrichina.org/fs/view/downloadables/pdf/download
able-resources/migrantschildren_02.pdf [hereinafter Shutting Out the Poorest]. But
see Ding Jianzhong, Overhauling and Regulating Schools Set Up by Migrants, 37
CHINESE EDUC. & SOC'Y 10 (2004) for a municipal government civil servant's
detailed account of the social "harms" created migrant schools.
101 See, e.g., York, supra note 7.
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tion of the central government's management of public finance and a corresponding abdication of its responsibility for social welfare. Localities
which were made subsequently responsible for the administration and finance of such programs deployed the migration-control mechanisms of the
household registration system as a means of rationing social services by
barring migrants access to these entitlements, while also selling access to
these services, such as public schooling, to those willing and able to pay.
This policy has redistributed the benefits of economic reform from China's
vast migrant population to their urban-native constituents.
The state's decentralization of the finance and management of public and social services has proven a net-negative for China's rural residents
at large, and for rural migrants in particular. While rural migrants have
realized substantial socioeconomic gains relative to their peers who have
remained in rural China during the Reform Era, they are a distant second
class to the permanent urban residents who enjoy privileged access to housing, health care, jobs, and, perhaps most importantly, education for their
children. 10 2 "Rural-urban migration, continuing discrimination against rural
hukou holders in the provision of public services, and recent reforms that
liberalize restrictions for the wealthy and educated are helping create an
excluded migrant underclass." 10 3 Whereas this divide was previously constituted solely along the rural-urban axis, the rural-urban dichotomy has
been exported to and reconstituted within the urban space during the Re104
form Era.
Continued reform of the household registration system will not
solve the question of migrant children's access to public education. To the
contrary, the ongoing and gradual relaxation of household registration requirements disproportionately benefits the moneyed and educated elite, empowering them with a de facto national mobility 0 5 while the rural poor
continue to be denied the benefits of full citizenship. Meanwhile, rural migrants instead are left to fend for themselves against an often inhospitable
and exploitative urban environment. Moreover, reform of the household
registration system will not address the state's underfunding of public
schooling.
Part II of this Comment will examine the potential legal bases for
the articulation of a "right to education" in China and show how China's
rule of law rhetoric perpetuates problems resulting from decentralization by
weakening the state's ability to protect individual rights-such as the right
102
103
104
105

Xiaogang Wu & Treiman, supra note 22, at 381.
China s Household Registration System, supra note 48, at 11.

Lei Guang, supra note 18, at 493.
Fei-Ling Wang, supra note 46, at 122.
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to education-at a time when the pace of economic development increases
private and public incentives to violate those rights.
II. CHINESE LAW

Chinese law has undergone a rapid transformation since the start of
the Reform Era in 1978.106 As the nation began to reform its economy,
China's leaders soon realized that legal reform would play an integral role
in the country's continuing economic development.10 7 Thirty years after the
start of the Reform Era, China's economic reforms have been successful on
many levels. Though these reforms have frequently been the subject of
controversy both within and outside the PRC, they have to a large extent
achieved their stated goal of lifting China out of poverty and placing the
still developing country at the heart of the world's economic and political
community of nations. Likewise, it could be argued that China's legal reforms have accomplished their stated goal of furthering economic reform.
But to measure China's progress on legal reform in this manner,
and in this manner alone, rings hollow, both because in the abstract-for
scholars and students of law, jurists, politicians, and engaged citizens-legal reform can and should do more than merely strengthen economic reform, and because China itself has characterized these reforms in recent
years as part of a broader effort to implement the rule of law in order to
protect the rights and values enshrined in Chinese law from infringement by
government and individuals. 10 8 When held to this measure, China's legal
reforms appear far less successful. Indeed, the rule of law in China has
See, e.g., Lan Cao, Symposium: "Rule of Law" in China, Introduction, 11 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 539, 539 (2003). "Since 1978, China has been transforming
its centrally planned economy to an increasingly market-based one, which it calls
.socialism with Chinese characteristics'." Id.
107 See Gewirtz, supra note 14, at 604. "China's leaders see developing its legal
system as an important element in its economic development by providing rules of
the game to guide transactions and institutions to enforce those rules." Other motives imputed to China's leaders for pursuing legal reform in China include restraining of political excesses and corruption, reforming government bureaucracy,
responding to the demands of an increasingly rights-conscious public, and legitimating party rule. Id.
108 See, e.g., Ian Dobinson, The Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China
(1997): Real Change or Rhetoric?, 11 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 1, 2-3 (2002)
(describing former President Jiang Zemin's announcement of his policy of "running the country according to the law and establishing a socialist rule of law country," and the addition of this policy to China's constitution).
106
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weakened even as the nation as a whole, and its economy in particular,
strengthened over last decade.
China's retreat from the rule of law is largely a reflection of the
continuing decentralization of the Chinese state, and of the nation's circumscribed vision of the goals of rule of law reform. Decentralization of the
Chinese state has increased the economic and political power of local governments relative to both the national government and China's population at
large. This in turn has led to a significant increase in the abuse of authority
at the local level. Much of this abuse occurs at the expense of individuals
who are defenseless but for the protections accorded them by law.
A dumbing-down of the rule of law over the past decade has led to
a tendency by the national and local governments to define legal reform in
narrow and rigidly procedural terms. National and local governments alike
eschew substantive reform of individual, political, civil, and human rights
in favor of continued reform of China's commercial law regime. A
dumbed-down rule of law creates the normative expectation first, that economic development should precede civil, social, and political development,
and second, that continued economic development will inevitably lead to
civil, social, and political development. By dumbing-down the rule of law,
China has defined rule of law reform in a way that excused the central and
local governments from having to provide for China's civil, social, or political development, while it pursued economic development. China's underappreciation of the role individual, political, civil, and human rights play in
the rule of law has led to a weakening of these rights relative to the abuses
of local authority.
The enforcement of individual, civil, political, and human rights has
not kept pace with the violations of these rights by local governments and
non-state actors in the most recent decade of the Reform Era. A dumbeddown rule of law in China legitimizes the underdevelopment of these rights
by creating a false expectation of their presumed development and ensures
continued progress along this current course will lead to the continued violations of these rights rather than the establishment of the rule of law. Migrant children's right to access free and compulsory public schooling
cannot and will not be guaranteed absent law reforms that more fully recognize individual, political, civil, and human rights and protects these rights
against abuses at the local level.
The following sections examine the decentralization of the Chinese
state and the dumbing-down of the rule of law, and explain how these developments have led to a weakening of the rule of law in the Reform Era.
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The Structure of Government in China

The People's Republic of China was founded in 1949.109 The structure of the Chinese government was then and is today defined by a separation of functions and a unity of powers under the nation's constitution as
interpreted by the National People's Congress (the "NPC"). 110 This unity or
fusion of powers was justified in earlier decades of the People's Republic
by the belief that the will of the Party, the government, and the people were
one. This fiction remains today,"1 though the concept's legitimacy and its
practice in fact were greatly undermined in the Reform Era by the weakening of the central government relative to local governments.
China's Constitution is formally considered to be the supreme legal
112
authority of the Chinese state, the law from which all other laws derive.
The PRC's first Constitution was adopted in 1953.113 This Constitution was
later superseded by those adopted in 1975,114 1978,115 and by China's curpmbl. (1982) (P.R.C.).
110 Randall Peerenboom, Globalization, Path Dependency and the Limits of Law:
Administrative Law Reform and Rule of Law in the People's Republic of China, 19
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 161, 198-99 (2001) [hereinafter Peerenboom, Globalization].
This structure differs substantially from that favored by Anglo societies which favors a comparatively broad diffusion of powers. See Benedict Sheehy, Fundamentally Conflicting Views of the Rule of Law in China and the West & Implicationsfor
Commercial Disputes, 26 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 225, 234 (2006) ("Whereas the
Anglo model has advocated the separation of powers, the CCP has designed a government based on unity of powers ....").Peerenboom, Globalization, supra, at
198. The Chinese system of government, though distinct from the Anglo model, is
not dissimilar to that of some European nations such as France. The role of the
Party will not be addressed in this Comment. For a description of the Party's relation to the structure of Chinese government, see id. at 200-01.
111 Sheehy, supra note 110, at 234.
112 Marc Rosenberg, The Chinese Legal System Made Easy: A Survey of the Structure of Government, Creation of Legislation, and the Judicial System under the
Constitution and Major Statutes of the People's Republic of China, 9 U. MIAMI
INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 225, 226 (2001). The precise role of the Constitution in
Chinese law is subject to debate. Critics argue that China's Constitution is an aspirational document lacking any binding legal force. Michael William Dowdle, Of
Parliaments, Pragmatism, and the Dynamics of ConstitutionalDevelopment: The
Curious Case of China, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 102 (2002).
113 XIANFA (1954) (P.R.C.); see Rosenberg, supra note 112, at 226 n.l.
114 XIANFA (1975) (P.R.C.); see Rosenberg, supra note 112, at 226 n.1.
109 XIANFA

115 XIANFA

(1978) (P.R.C.); see Rosenberg, supra note 112, at 226 n..
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rent Constitution, adopted in 1982.116 The present Constitution has been
amended on four occasions, most recently in 2004.117
The NPC is the highest organ of state power under the constitu8
tion" and is vested with the legislative authority of the central government. 119 The NPC is composed of a large number of deputies constituted
120
around the more powerful members of the Standing Committee.
Continuing down the hierarchy of legislative authority in China, the
Constitution treats the local people's congresses of various levels as local
organs of state power. 121 This permits local congresses and the governments which they empower to enact laws and regulations "suitable to local
conditions," provided such laws and regulations do not contravene superordinate law such as the Constitution, or the laws or regulations adopted by
the central government. Consequently, there are four levels of legislative
authority in China (listed in descending order of significance): (1) the Constitution; (2) "basic laws" and other major legislation adopted by the NPC
and its Standing Committee; (3) administrative regulations adopted by the
State Council; and (4) the local regulations of the various people's con22
gresses at the provincial, autonomous regional, and city levels.'
Local regulations can be further subdivided into three basic categories, including (1) regulations supplementary to national legislation which is
required to adapt superior law to "local conditions," (2) regulations supplementary to national legislation that are more specific, and (3) regulations
116 XIANFA

(1982) (P.R.C.); see Rosenberg, supra note 112, at 226 n.l.

M. Ulric Killion, China's Amended Constitution: Quest for Liberty and Independent Judicial Review, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 43, 45 (2005). For a
117

brief description of these four amendments, see id. at 56.
118 XIANFA

19

XIANFA

art. 57, § 1 (2004) (P.R.C).
art. 58, § 1 (2004) (P.R.C).

arts 57-59, § 1(2004) (P.R.C). The Constitution provides for five statelevel organs beneath the NPC, among which the executive and judicial powers are
distributed. These are (1) the State Council, the highest organ of state administration (XIANFA § 3); (2) the President of the PRC (XIANFA § 2); (3) the People's
120 XIANFA

Court

(XIANFA

§ 7); (4) the Procuratorate

(XIANFA

§ 7); and (5) the Central Mili-

tary Commission (XIANFA § 4). The State Council and the People's Court are thus
responsible to the NPC, though they are both granted a degree of independence by
the Constitution. Peerenboom, Globalization,supra note 110, at 198-99, citing Xi
ANFA arts. 3, 85, 89, 92, 126, 128.
121 XIANFA
122

(2004) (P.R.C.).

See Rosenberg, supra note 112, at 247. See Peerenboom, Globalization, supra

note 110, at n.216 for a more detailed analysis of China's present legislative
hierarchy.
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that deal with strictly local issues. 123 Thus, local governments are in theory,
permitted to enact laws which vary "slightly" from those passed by the
Central Government. These laws are deemed valid so long as they are consistent with the general principles and policies of superior laws. In practice,
these laws may differ substantially from superordinate legislation. Even in
124
these instances, "unconstitutional" laws are seldom overturned.
China's legal system is beset by a number of problems. One of the
more significant problems is the "sheer complexity" of the legislative system. 125 As discussed above, a number of entities-including the NPC, local
people's congresses, the State Council and its administrative agencies, and
local governments at each the provincial, and sub-provincial levels-are
empowered to issue legal pronouncements of varying degrees of authority.126 Moreover, the lines of authority for lawmaking on many issues are
127
poorly defined and occasionally subject to dispute.
This practice of allowing local governments to implement legislation at odds with national laws-including the Constitution-but otherwise
"suitable to local conditions," is at the heart of the ongoing decentralization
of the Chinese state, and the nation's failure to implement the rule of law.
The continued violation of migrant children's right to education reflects in a
microcosm these two problems.
Decentralization has taken place over the course of nearly three decades and has remained constant through several periods of oscillating economic policies and objectives. 128 The effect of China's decentralization on
See Rosenberg, supra note 112, at 247.
124 Peerenboom, Globalization, supra note 110, at 210 ("Not only has the NPC yet
to strike down any of the laws of its Standing Committee as unconstitutional, the
Standing Committee has rarely annulled any lower-level rules on grounds of
unconstitutionality.").
125 Peerenboom, Globalization, supra note 110, at 205.
126 Peerenboom, Globalization, supra note 110, at 205. These legal pronouncements include "abewildering and inconsistent array of laws, regulations, provisions, measures, directives, notices, decisions and explanations, all claiming to be
normatively binding and treated as such by the creating entity."
127 See Peerenboom, Globalization, supra note 110, at 206 (stating that the State
Council, administrative agencies and the myriad of local people's congresses and
governments appear to have been granted certain inherent authority to legislate by
the Constitution and the Law on Legislation).
128 Donald C. Clarke identifies four distinct stages of economic development and
law reform in China. These four stages include (1) the years of "pre-market" reforms from 1978 to1984; (2) the period of early market reform from 1985 to 1989;
(3) a brief period of retrenchment following the Tiananmen Square Incident, lasting
from 1989 to1992; and (4) a period, dating from supreme leader Deng Xiaoping's
123
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the country's ability to carry-out law reform was plainly visible by the mid1990s. 129 Though decentralization slowed and even reversed in some sectors,130 the trend has largely continued with respect to both migration and
compulsory education. "The legitimate right of the centre to direct the acBut the centre's ability
tions of local officials is not seriously contested ....
and inclination to monitor its agents is not uniform across sectors."' 13 1 This
disinclination on the part of the central government to constructively engage the development of migrant communities created a vacuum into which
local governments and private actors have inserted themselves in order to
exploit, through rent-seeking migrant workers and their families.
B.

The Right to Education

China's Constitution recognizes the right of citizens to receive edu34
cation. 132 China's Education Law133 and the Compulsory Education Law,
Southern Tour, in which "China has taken major steps to create an economic and
legal system that fully and explicitly embraces the private sector as an important
component of the economy," from 1992 to the present. The author rejects the notion that China's accession to the WTO marks a fifth stage. Clarke, Market Economy in China, supra note 13, at 569-71, 575.
129 See, e.g., Donald C. Clarke, Introduction: The Chinese Legal System Since
1995: Steady Development and Striking Continuities, 191 CHINA Q. 555, 556
(2007) [hereinafter Introduction: Chinese Legal System]. In a 1995 Introduction to
a collection of essays on the future of Chinese law, the long-time China law scholar
Stanley Lubman "pointed to a number of factors clouding the future of Chinese law
reform, in particular the 'growing weakness of the Chinese apparatus of state' and
declining power of the central government over the rest of the country. Id., quoting
Stanley Lubman, Introduction: The Future of Chinese Law, 141 CHINA Q. 1, 14
(1995).
130 See, e.g., Introduction: Chinese Legal System, supra note 129, at 556, 557.
131 Introduction: Chinese Legal System, supra note 129, at 557, commenting on
Murray Scott Tanner & Eric Green, Principalsand Secret Agents: Central versus
Local Control Over Policing and Obstacles to 'Rule of Law' in China, 191 CHINA
Q. 644.
132 XIANFA art. 46.
133 Education Law (promulgated by NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG., Mar. 18, 1995, effective Sept. 1, 1995) (P.R.C.).
134 Compulsory Education Law (revised), supra note 1. The Compulsory Education Law was initially adopted at the Fourth Session of the Sixth NPC in 1986
before being revised by the Standing Committee of the Tenth NPC in the summer
of 2006. Compulsory Education Law (promulgated by STANDING COMM. NAT'L
PEOPLE'S CONG., Apr. 12, 1986, effective July 1, 1986) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Compulsory Education Law (1986)], available at LAWINFOCHINA.
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both promulgated by China's highest legislative body and supreme constitutional authority, the NPC, 135 make explicit the "right to education" set forth
in the Constitution. 136 The Education Law reaffirms the Constitution's provision that China's citizens enjoy both "the right and obligation to receive
education," 137 and further provides that "the State applies a system of nineyear compulsory education." 138 The Compulsory Education Law, in turn,
reaffirms the State's commitment to the provision of nine-year compulsory
education. 139
The two laws part ways on matters of additional fees for compulsory education, however. The Compulsory Education Law explicitly prohibits fees to supplement compulsory schooling, stating that "tuition fees
and miscellaneous fees shall not be charged."' 140 No qualifications are appended to this particular provision to diminish its effect. Chapter 1, article
4 of the Compulsory Education Law further provides that school-aged citizens of the People's Republic enjoy an equal right to receive compulsory
141
education without regard to, in pertinent part, family financial status.
Taken together, these two provisions offer implicit protection for migrant
children.
Chapter 2, article 12 of the same law expands upon these implicit
protections by addressing directly the issue of access to compulsory education for students not present at their place of permanent residence. The
provision begins by requiring local governments to ensure children attend
schools near their places of permanent residence, but continues by requiring
that local governments-most likely in "host" areas-provide non-resident
students equal opportunity to receive compulsory education while absent
from their places of permanent residence. 142 The law states explicitly:
[i]f a school-age child or adolescent, whose parent or other statutory guardian works or lives outside the place where his registered permanent residence is located, needs to receive compulsory education in the
place where his parents or other statutory guardians work or live, the local
See Rosenberg, supra note 112, at 227-29 for a more detailed explanation of the
NPC's function relative to other agents of national authority.
136 XIANFA art 46.
137 Education Law, supra note 133, ch. 1, art. 9.
138 Id., ch. 2, art. 18.
135

139

Compulsory Education Law (revised), supra note 1, ch. 1, art. 2.

140

Id. This provision was also present in the 1986 version. Compulsory Education

Law (1986), supra note 134.
141

142

Compulsory Education Law (revised), supra note 1, ch. 1, art. 4.
Id. ch. 2, art. 12.
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people's governments shall provide him with equal opportunity to receive
143
compulsory education.
The above provisions proscribing the charging of fees for compulsory education and guaranteeing Chinese citizens equal opportunity to receive compulsory education regardless of "family financial status"' 44 and/or
place of permanent residence appear to contradict certain provisions of the
Education Law.
Chapter 1, articles 14 and 15 of the Education Law devolves responsibility for the implementation of compulsory education from the NPC
to the State Council and to the local governments, allowing for the administration of educational work according to the principles of tiered management and responsibility. 45 The Education Law further vests "the State
Council, the people's governments of provinces, autonomous regions, and
municipalities directly under the Central Government" with the authority
146
"to levy local charges for educational purposes."'
The Compulsory Education Law, for its part, allows for the continued-albeit temporary-existence of fees for compulsory schooling in
Chapter 8, article 61.147 The law therein provides that "[t]he State Council
shall separately formulate the implementation procedures for exemption
from any miscellaneous fee for school-age children and adolescents receiving compulsory education,"' 148 thus devolving responsibility for the elimination of fees to the State Council. Neither law defines explicitly illegal or
legal fees.
As noted above, the increased fiscal responsibility and consequent
autonomy which local governments have assumed in the Reform Era has
led to a proliferation of legislation. 149 The result is that at present "a remarkable number of lower level rules and regulations" are in conflict with
superior law or otherwise unconstitutional,15 despite the Constitution's explicit provision that "[n]o law or administrative or local rules and regulaId.
Id. ch. 1, art. 4.
145 Education Law, supra note 133, ch. 1, art. 14-15.
146 Id., ch. 7, art. 57. Articles 59 and 62 further address the collection of fees and
the disbursement of revenues derived therefrom. Id.
147 Compulsory Education Law (revised), supra note 1, ch. 8 art. 61.
143

144

148

Id.

Peerenboom, Globalization, supra note 110 at 207.
Peerenboom, Globalization, supra note 110 at 169. See also id. at 206 citing a
study conducted in the mid-1980s which showed that approximately two-thirds of
the local legislation passed in Hebei province and the province-level municipalities
of Beijing and Tianjin was inconsistent with the Constitution.
149

150
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15 1
In Beijing, local governments
tions shall contravene the constitution."'
take advantage of this ambiguity by demanding prohibitively high fees from
migrant students.
The present financial structure of compulsory education is largely
to blame. The decentralization of education relieves the central government
of the financial burden of providing for public schooling, but comes at a
significant cost to local government, schools, families, their children, and to
society as a whole. 15 - The charging of student fees and the institutional
exclusion of migrant students from public schooling allows local governments and schools to raise additional funds for operational costs and, in
some case, for profit. Decentralization of education financing thus creates a
situation in which poor families who are most in need and arguably benefit
the most 153 from compulsory education are priced out of "public"

schooling.

15 4

Though migration at present is encouraged by the central government, its effects are unaddressed. Encouraging migration while denying
migrants access to social services ensures both a transfer of wealth from
rural to urban sectors and a redistribution of this wealth within urban areas
from migrants to permanent residents; that is, migrants bring wealth to the
cities but take little of it for themselves. The relaxation of household registration policies during the Reform Era has accordingly benefited those willing and able to either pay for access to social services or purchase residency
permits in their host cities, 155 and has failed to address fundamental imbal156
ances and injustices created by the system at its inception.
art. 5.
Tomasevski, supra note 89, at n.7. Others have argued that decentralized educa-

151 XIANFA
152

tion policy-making and implementation is responsible for China's success in universalizing primary education, at least relative to India. See Nirmala Rao, Kai-Ming
Cheng & Kirti Narain, Primary Schooling in China and India: Understanding how
Socio-Contextual FactorsModerate the Role of the State, 49 INT'L REV. EDUC. 153
(2003); see also Tsang, supra note 78, at 14 (noting in part that "[t]he reform has
been indispensable for supporting the quantitative development of the education

sector since the 1980s.").
153 Returns to investments in education have increased substantially in the postreform era, especially in the 1990s. Fang Cai et al., supra note 7, at 15. For those
born to rural families, education is a crucial means of socio-economic advancement. Rural hukou status, however, has been found to "significantly decrease educational attainment," Xiaogang Wu & Treiman, supra note 22, at 381.
151 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, supra note 81,
10.
"I China's Household Registration System, supra note 48, at 1.
156 Id. at 6.
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Previous efforts to address the issues have taken several forms but
have been generally ineffective. Expansive efforts such as household registration reform-the foundation of the formal barrier just mentioned-failed
because of the increasingly decentralized and fragmented nature of the finance and management of social services and other entitlements to which
the national registration system services as the nominal means of access.
Services such as education, which are financed and managed by local governments, have not and will not respond to abstract amendments of the
household registration system because such amendments fail to resolve the
underfunding of these services which drives the exclusion of migrants.
Meanwhile, calls by national authorities for the elimination of fees go unheeded by local governments.
The central government has recognized these issues as a serious
threat to the integrity of its leadership, and has ramped up its effort in recent
years to implement the rule of law by rationalizing governance, increasing
government efficiency, reining in local officials and rooting out corruption. 57 The central government appears to be fighting a losing battle, however. Power has devolved from the central government to local
governments, and national legislation is seldom enforced. 58 Local governments-in particular, Beijing municipal and district governments-continue to tolerate the charging of fees, which is not only inconsistent with
national law, but appears to directly contradict both the tenor and letter of
the recently enacted Compulsory Education Law.
Local power is now deeply entrenched.
[T]he growth of the market economy has exposed a number
of gaps in other areas of the legal system, such as labor and
environmental protection and the social safety net. These
gaps mattered little in the pre-reform era because they
could be addressed, at least in theory, through bureaucratic
directives internal to the state-owned economy without the
need for a legal system external to the actors. Market-oriented reform has arguably heightened the need for regulaSee, e.g., Peerenboom, Globalization,supra note 110, at 168.
See, e.g., Xin He, Why Do They Not Comply With The Law? Illegality and
Semi-Legality Among Rural-UrbanMigrant Entrepreneurs in Beijing, 39 LAW &
Soc'y REV. 527, 527-28 (2005); Xin Frank He, Sporadic Law Enforcement Campaigns as a Means of Social Control: A Case Study from a Rural-UrbanMigrant
Enclave in Beijing, 17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 121, 122-23 (2003) (showing that national campaigns to enforce the decisions and policies of central authorities are
routinely undermined by "legal collusion" at the local level).
157
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tion at the same time that it has made regulation by
159
traditional methods ineffective.
It would be difficult for the national government to reverse nearly
of decentralization by attempting to reconsolidate control
decades
three
over the management of public finance and social welfare at the center as
was done in the pre-Reform Era. Similarly, elimination of the household
registration system within the present context characterized by high degrees
of decentralization and local autonomy will not address the broader injustices suffered by rural migrants in the urban areas, because the incentives
for rent-seeking by local governments remain strong. Elimination of the
registration system, as such, would only serve to further lessen central authority relative to that of China's local governments.
C.

The Rule of Law

The rule of law is a loosely interpreted and at times vague concept, 160 the meaning of which is deeply contested among scholars. 161 In
Market Economy in China, supra note 13, at 568.
See Alvaro Santos, The World Bank's Uses of the "Rule of Law" Promise in
Economic Development, in THE NEW LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 253, 257 (David Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
161 See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. Rev.
781, 781-82 (1989). Western conceptions of the rule of law trace their origins to the
writings of Aristotle, Montesquieu, Locke, who emphasized the importance of law
in protecting society from the potentially arbitrary and abusive authority of government. See, e.g., Santos, supra note 160, at 257. The rule of law has more recently
been invoked as necessary to the founding of a market economy, and, as such, has
been promoted in developing and transition economies across the globe. The connection between the rule of law, markets, and economic development is based in
large part on the work of Friedrich Hayek, Max Weber, and, more broadly, by the
work of modernization theorists. Under this theory, efficient markets require the
protection of private property and freedom of contract. The rule of law was necessary to ensure the integrity of these rights. Markets, in turn, fuel economic growth
which leads gradually, according to modernization theory, to the growth of the
middle class and a demand for democracy. See William P. Alford, Exporting "The
159
160

Pursuitof Happiness," 113

HARV.

L.

REV.

1677, 1683 (2000) (book review); John

K.M. Ohnesorge, Asia's Legal Systems in the Wake of the Financial Crisis: Can

the Rule of Law Carry Any of the Weight?, in NEOLIBERALISM AND INSTITUTIONAL
REFORM IN EAST ASIA 63, 68 (Meredith Jung-En Woo ed., forthcoming) [hereinafter Asia's Legal Systems]; see also Friedrich Hayek, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM
(1944). Hayek's formulation of the rule of law was largely limited to its instrumental aspect, and focused on the power of law to limit the actions of government.
Rules, "fixed and announced beforehand," allow individuals to foresee potential
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spite of its contested meaning, however, the rule of law is commonly described, in its most general sense, as some combination of legal form, process and substance which helps protect certain enumerated rights and values
from violation by government and individuals. 162 Instrumental conceptions
of the rule of law emphasize process and the "form" of law over substance,
while substantive conceptions tend to do the reverse.1 63 An instrumental
conception, though it guarantees protection against arbitrary acts of government and the unlawful acts of individuals through the enforcement of "law

coercive intrusions of government authority, which in turn allows individuals to
plan their activities and regulate their behaviors accordingly. See Asia's Legal Systems, supra, at 70, citing Hayek, supra. This conception of the rule of law limits its
substantive vision to a small range of rights in property and contract. This interpretation of the rule of law has proved popular with law reform advocates both inside
and outside of China and is discussed in greater detail below. Many scholars have
chosen to define the rule of law by what it is not, namely, the "rule of men." See,
e.g., Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 101 MICH. L. REv. 179, 222-23 (2002);
Teemu Ruskola, Law Without Law, or Is "Chinese Law" an Oxymoron?, 11 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 655, 655 (2003). "The debate over just what the rule of law
means remains unresolved, yet there is remarkable consensus on what it is not: the
rule men." Id. at 656. Ruskola points out that, as many a scholar has noted throughout the past several centuries, "historically Chinese legal institutions have been
built on the ideological premise of rule of men." He cautions readers, however,
against allowing this normative dichotomy (rule of law vs. rule of men) and historical interpretation to lead them too hastily to the conclusion that "Chinese law" is an
oxymoron. "Ultimately,' he concludes, "the rule-of-law/rule-of-men distinction is
too moralistic and too black-and-white to be of analytic utility." Id. at 656. It is for
precisely this reason that the present Comment makes only passing reference to the
rule of men.
162 Larry Cata Backer, Chinese Constitutionalism,Sange Daibiao (the "Three Represents"), and the Rule of Law, 16 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 33-34
(2006); see also, Asia's Legal Systems, supra note 161, at 67.
163 Instrumental and substantive conceptions can be defined in a number of ways.
Common formulations of the instrumental conception of the rule of law may emphasize, for example, generality, notice, prospectivity, clarity, non-contradictoriness, conformability, stability, and congruence. Substantive formulations-or at
least those favored by scholars working in the western liberal-democratic tradition-might stress liberty, justice, and equity. Radin, supra note 161, at 781-87
"The substantive conception is a model of government by rules to achieve the goals
of the social contract [while] [t]he instrumental conception is a model of government by rules to achieve the government's ends, whatever they may be." Radin,
supra note 161, at 792.
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16 4
and order," does little to shape the positive law adopted by the state.
Divorced from substance, an instrumental conception would be indifferent
to broad human ideals such as democracy, individual dignity, and social
equity, as well as those ideals particular to governance, including the separation of powers, and equal access to courts. 165 This instrumental conception has been referred to elsewhere as a "thin" rule of law, or as the rule
"by" law. 166 A purely substantive conception, meanwhile, would have no
way of guaranteeing the practice of its ideals. Though scholars, as an ana-

164 See, e.g., John K.M. Ohnesorge, On Rule of Law Rhetoric, Economic Development, and Northeast Asia (2003), available at http://law.wisc.edu/faculty/down
load.php?ilD=73 [hereinafter Rule of Law Rhetoric]; J. Ohnesorge, Etat de droit
(Rule of Law) et dveloppement economique, 18 CRITIQUE INTERNATIONALE 46
(Jan. 2003) (English translation of tat de droit).
165 Radin, supra note 161, at 786. Notably procedural rule of law regimes include
the early government of Nazi Germany, the Vichy Republic of France, and, more
recently, the apartheid government of South Africa. See, e.g., id.; David Kairys,
Searchingfor the Rule of Law, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 307, 322 (2003); Backer,
supra note 162, at 33-34. Kairys noted that "South Africa, before apartheid was
abolished, had an elaborate judiciary and a history of law that was predominantly
drawn, like ours, from British origins. Since apartheid was the law, following the
law to the letter, or following the spirit of the law, was oppressive. Protection of
human rights, as occurred in the occasional court ruling, required judges to place
certain values negated by their laws and system, like equality, above what the law
said and had been interpreted to mean." Id. An instrumental conception might, in
the extreme, be used to legitimate otherwise obvious crimes against humanity or
violations of human rights. See, e.g., Backer, supra note 162, at 33-34.
166 See generally Peerenboom, Law and Development, supra note 12. Recognizing

that the application of law is subject to discretion in nations large and small, old
and new, "developed" and "developing"; and that law is thus to some extent an
instrumentality of government in all states, Peerenboom has countered these critics
by arguing for the existence of a "thin rule of law" which recognizes a broad spectrum of instrumentality. "Critics often speak of the 'lack' or 'absence' of rule of
law during periods of high growth, as if rule of law were a discrete variable, either
present in perfect form or absent altogether. This suggests that the legal systems
were wholly dysfunctional, imposing no limits whatsoever on administrative discretion or state actors and providing no relief for private parties seeking to settle
disputes." Id. at 196; see also John K.M. Ohnesorge, The Rule of Law 14.11, in
ANNUAL REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (forthcoming) ("Rule by law can be
considered a formal or thin Rule of Law, whereas Rule for many conveys a sense
of something thicker, imbued with substantive values such as democracy or human
rights.") (emphasis added). But see Sheehy, supra note 110, at 248 for a mild criticism of Peerenboom's "thin rule of law," noting that "[i]t is immediately evident
that this list is completely lacking in normative content."

246

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 14

lytical matter, frequently frame the rule of law within one conception or the
other-or some variation thereof16 7-the implementation or manifestation
of the rule of law, as a practical matter, often encompasses both the instrumental and substantive components of the concept. 168
Chinese leaders have made frequent reference to the rule of law in
recent years. To contemplate these leaders' understanding of the rule of
law or their non-rhetorical purpose in advocating the rule of law in the PRC
is to be led down the garden path by the mistaken notion that, in a decentralized Chinese state, the will of the center is binding upon the actions of
the local. Decentralization of the Chinese state has increased the economic
and political power of local governments relative to both the national government and China's population at large. This, in turn, has led to a significant increase in the abuse of authority at the local level, as evidenced by the
continued charging of school fees for migrant children. Rule of law rhetoric has been used to both describe and prescribe law reforms which privilege economic development over civil, social, and political development.
This creates the normative expectation first, that economic development
should precede civil, social, and political development, and second, that
continued economic development will inevitably lead to civil, social, and
political development. The institutional exclusion of migrant workers from
mainstream society at large and the violation of their children's right to
education undermines these expectations and further suggests that the rule
of law has weakened in China.
Rule of law rhetoric was met with resistance in China during the
first half of the Reform Era.169 This resistance reached its peak in the years
immediately following the Tiananmen Square Incident of 1989, as the Chinese leadership entered a period of political retrenchment and as the nation
was isolated economically from its chief trade partners, the United States,
the European Union (the "EU"), and Japan. The Tiananmen Square Incident increased the visibility for outside observers of human and civil rights
abuses in China, and the denouncement of the Chinese government's use of
force to quell the Tiananmen protests quickly became a priority for politiSee, e.g., Santos, supra note 160, at 257, and Radin, supra note 161, at 782,
both of whom further dissects the traditional dichotomy of process and substance to
articulate alternative conceptions of the rule of law, including a "social practice"
conception, and hybridized institutional- and intrinsic- conceptions.
168 "[T]he central precepts of the Rule of Law can be defended either instrumentally, as necessary to make a legal system work to structure behavior, or substantively, as necessary to fairness, human dignity, freedom, and democracy." Radin,
167

supra note 161, at 791.
169 Gewirtz, supra note 14, at 609.
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cians and governments throughout much of the developed world. The EU
and Japan used diplomatic and economic sanctions to chasten China's perceived human rights abuses, while the United States, in addition to these
sanctions, used the denial of Most Favored Nation ("MFN") trading status
as a means to prod, criticize, and ultimately condemn China for its past and
170
ongoing human and civil rights abuses.
This period of retrenchment and isolation was short-lived, however.
The European Union and Japan quickly curtailed or abandoned altogether
their respective sanctions against China within a year or two of the
Tiananmen Square Incident, 171 and China soon after resumed its policy of
economic reform. 172 At this time, proponents of economic reform in China
began to more seriously consider the role the role that law reform would
have on the continued development of the Chinese economy.
As the China's economic reforms gathered momentum during the
1990s, the continued denial of MFN trading status to China became increasingly costly in the minds of American politicians. In response, calls
emerged within the United States for a policy of engagement with China,
culminating in China's accession to the WTO, to help speed progress on
173
human and civil rights.

At the same time, rule of law rhetoric experienced a revival of sorts
in political and legal discourse as international financial institutions, western governments, and NGOs began to explore with increasing seriousness
the long-discredited notion that law reform could be used to promote economic development and modernization. 174 This view traces its origins to
175
the Law and Development literature of the mid- to late-twentieth century,
which viewed the protection of private property and freedom of contract as
See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson, A Trojan Horse Behind Chinese Walls?
Problems and Prospects of U.S. -Sponsored "Rule of Law" Reform Projects in the
People's Republic of China, 18 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 64, 69 (2000).
171 See, e.g., RICHARD YOUNGS, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE PROMOTION OF
DEMOCRACY 167 (2001); Frangois Godement, A New Relationship Between the
West and Pacific Asia?, in TOWARDS RECOVERY IN PACIFIC ASIA 121, 121 (Gerald
170

Segal & David S.G. Goodman eds., 1999).
172 Economic reform resumed following Deng Xiaoping's "Southern Tour," during
which the supreme leader reaffirmed the importance of economic development to
China's continued rise. See Market Economy in China, supra note 13, at 571.
173 See, e.g., Stephenson, supra note 170, at 69.
174 See, e.g., Rule of Law Rhetoric, supra note 164, at 5-7.
175

See, e.g., Asia's Legal Systems, supra note 161, at 68; Stephenson, supra note

170, at 65-66.
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essential to the development of a market economy and, by extension, the
176
rule of law.
When the Rule of Law is invoked in Law & Development literature
a standard set of prescriptions thus tends to follow. Private property must be
protected first through criminal law, then through private law-the law of
property and contract-that will allow "competent" courts to enforce the
rights bargained for between market actors and enshrined in contracts....
Other statutory regimes such as those creating and protecting intellectual
property rights are explained and legitimated in basically the same manner:
as creating the property rights incentive structure that will maximize the
77
activities of rational economic actors.
Though the Law and Development movement suffered a crisis of
faith in the 1970s and 1980s, 178 and though its idea that certain legislative
prescriptions could "heal" a developing country's ailing economy was
largely discredited at that time, the movement regenerated during the 1990s.
Ultimately, the Law and Development movement won support from influential scholars and, perhaps more importantly, politicians eager to engage
179
an economically developing China.
See, e.g., Asia's Legal Systems, supra note 161, at 68.
177 Asia's Legal Systems, supra note 161, at 68.
178 This crisis was the result of the work of David Trubek and Marc Galanterthemselves, law and development scholars-and their "eclectic critique," which
undermined many of the law development movement's assumptions about the nature of law and its relationship to politics and society in developing countries. See
David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections
on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 4 Wisc. L.
REV. 1062 (1974); see also John K.M. Ohnesorge, Politics, Ideology, and Legal
System Reform in Northeast Asia, in GLOBALISATION AND RESISTANCE: LAW REFORM IN ASIA SINCE THE CRISIS 105 (Christoph Antons & Volkmar Gessner eds.,
2007) [hereinafter Politics]; and Stephenson, supra note 170, at 65-66 (both
describing Trubek and Galanter's impact on the law and development movement
during the 1970s).
179 See, e.g., Eric W. Orts, The Rule of Law in China, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
43, 46-47 (2001) (describing the bipartisan tendency within the United States to
invoke rule of law rhetoric when justifying engagement with China in the debates
preceding the U.S. grant of permanent normal trade relations to the PRC-a requirement for China's accession to the WTO); Stephenson, supra note 170, at 6971 (describing the bilateral political dimensions to the United States' engagement
of China on the rule of law). For more detailed narratives of the rise and fall and
then rise again of the Law and Development movement, see generally Politics,
supra note 178; Stephenson, supra note 170, at 69-71; David M. Trubek, Law and
Development: Then and Now, 90 AM. SoC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 223 (1996).
176
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For these scholars and politicians, rule of law reforms were seen as
one part of a larger strategy to engage China, to help it establish the institutions, laws and policies fundamental to the rule of law in the United States,
and to thereby set in motion China's progress down a path of development
reasonably compatible with western liberal democracy. 180 Under this formulation, economic engagement with China would promote the development of law in areas affecting international trade and economic governance,
which would then "'spill over' into the realms of politics and individual
rights."18 ' This "spill over" conception of the rule of law proved attractive
to both American business and human rights communities, and gave each of
182
their constituencies a common ideal to rally around.
Over the next few years, during the mid- to late-1990s, the rule of
law became a high-profile issue in United States-China relations, and programs promoting the rule of law in China received extensive funding from
both public and private U.S.-based sources. The vision the U.S. government and many NGOs have for change in China is based on a link between
economic progress and political reform. 183 This vision continued to draw
upon the earlier formulations of the rule of law championed by modernization theorists and their law and development successors. 184 Accordingly, in
promoting the rule of law in China, the U.S. government and NGOs largely
concentrated on strengthening the competence and autonomy of the judicial
and legislative branches of the Chinese government, and on promoting administrative decentralization. 185 These efforts are consistent both with the
United States' understanding of its own rule of law-which favors the separation of powers and a process-oriented constitutionalism' 86-and with its
180

See Stephenson, supra note 170, at 69.

181

Rule of Law Rhetoric, supra note 164, at 4.

Speaking at a conference of U.S. business leaders in early 1998, then Secretary
of State Madeline Albright noted that the establishment of rule of law in China
182

would make the People's Republic a good place to do business. Stephenson supra

note 165, at 74-75. This view is shared by many in the international business community. Kairys, supra note 165, at 307.
183 See, e.g., Rule of Law Rhetoric, supra note 164, at 8.
184 Id.
See, e.g., Jacques deLisle, Lex Americana?: United States Legal Assistance,
American Legal Models, and Legal Change in the Post-Communist World and Beyond, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 179, 217-18 (1999). See generally Horsley, supra
note 12 at 93, 97-102.
185

See Backer, supra note 162, at 40 (noting an historical U.S. preference for "process constitutionalism").
186
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commercial interests in China, which are often subject to administrative
oversight.
Since the United States undertook engagement with China,
"[t]housands of laws and other legal measures have been enacted; the court
system has been revamped; a host of new regulatory bodies has been established; and a bar that numbered 3000 in 1979 has already multiplied more
than fifty-fold (with plans to expand to 300,000 over the next decade), facilitating citizen use of the legal system in unprecedented numbers.' 1 87
China's accession to the WTO has made the reform of the nation's underdeveloped commercial and administrative law regimes a top priority for legal
professionals and politicians both within China and without. 188 This priority has led to the promulgation, reform, and in some instances revocation of
several basic laws and subordinate legislation. 189 U.S. private and public
efforts have also focused on more substantive reforms-including the reform of China's criminal procedure law, and "related human rights issues"19 0-but these efforts pale in comparison to both the number and
extent of reforms that U.S. sources have promoted in commercial law.
So what does this have to do with access to public schooling for
migrant children in urban China? These efforts are among the most concerted in recorded history to construct a legal system and, in the most recent
decade, to establish the rule of law. And yet, these efforts have failed to
enlarge the scope of China's individual, political, civil, and human rights.
These programs have tended in years past to focus on what this Comment
refers to as "instrumental" reforms, that is, reforms directed at professionalizing the bench and the bar, or which emphasize form, procedure and pro187
188

Alford, supra note 161, at 1707.
See, e.g., deLisle, supra note 185, at 223.

189 "Both before and after WTO accession, China made great efforts towards institutional reforms in order to comply with WTO obligations. These included amending and revoking over 2,000 trade-related laws and enacting new laws." Huang
Dongli, Commentary on "Trade, Investment and Beyond," 191 CHINA Q. 742, 743
(2007). Using the four periods of reform set forth by Donald Clarke and described
in supra note 128, China's NPC adopted on average twice as many laws in the
most recent period of reform (approximately 10 such laws per year from 1992 to
the present) than it did in each the three preceding periods. See, e.g., Market Economy in China, supra note 13 at 569-71, 575. The vast majority of these laws were
either commercial or administrative in character. Relatively few, by contrast, dealt
explicitly or implicitly with individual, political, civil, or human rights. See, e.g.,
deLisle, supra note 185, at 220-23.
190 deLisle, supra note 185, at 219-20.
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cess over substance, 191 and have seldom addressed development needs in
matters of civil, social, or political rights.
China's invocation of the rule of law has, in fact, often been used to
frustrate the expansion of these rights-what might be referred to as "liberal legality,"1 92 given their prominence in liberal democratic theory.
China's distaste for liberal legality is well-known. 193 As law reform progresses in the PRC and the instrumentalities of the rule of law have take
root, the Chinese central and local governments have been increasingly
willing and able to justify the harsh treatment of dissidents, the disenfranchised, and marginalized populations in terms of positive law. 194 Moreover, foreign engagement with Chinese businesses appears to have led to a
disengagement from the China's domestic legal system, thus challenging
the belief that the rule of law as practiced in business communities outside
of China might "spill-over" undirected into Chinese domestic law. 195 This
undermines the popular notion within China and abroad that continued economic development will lead inevitably to further civil, social, and political
development in the PRC, and weakens the notion that economic development should as a practical matter precede the development of individual,
political, civil, and human rights.
The United States' preference for reforms relating to commercial
law in China is a reflection both of its own interests and objectives and,
perhaps more importantly, China's own short-term interests. Foreign and
domestic enterprise have prospered handsomely during the past decades of
economic development, and, barring a radical departure from the status quo
ante, each is likely to continue to prosper in the years ahead. Thus, neither
foreign nor domestic industry has much interest in agitating the central gov96
ernment for a broadening of law reform beyond the commercial sphere.1
The educated urban elite similarly have little incentive to rock the boat, as it
were, given that China continues to provide for an increased standard of
191 Ohnesorge draws a similar distinction between reforms which limit their scope
to form, procedure, and/or process at the expense of broad substantive change. See,
e.g., Rule of Law Rhetoric, supra note 164, at 7-9. For a brief description of development efforts undertaken by western NGOs, see deLisle, supra note 185, at 218.
192 Alford, supra note 161, at 1707.
193"It's generally agreed ...that the U.S. and Chinese sides have different things
in mind when they talk about the rule of law." Stephenson, supra note 170, at 76.
194 See, e.g., Alford, supra note 161, at 1707.
195 See, e.g., id. at 1700 n.50.
196 See, e.g., John Ohnesorge, Chinese Administrative Law in the Northeast Asian
Mirror, 16 J. TRANS. L. & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 103, 161 (2006).
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living among the middle class, as it has done with reasonable consistency
197
for the past several decades.
China may, perhaps, view the expansion of civil rights and liberties
as a threat to its continued economic development. The idea, though peculiar, is not without precedent. 198 This position fails to recognize that these
rights and liberties determine, in large part, one's ability to shape and benefit from the nation's chosen course of economic development. Thus, in the
case of China's migrant workers and their children, access to education is of
central importance to their families' ability to participate more fully in the
nation's rapid economic development. "[I]t seems doubtful that limiting
substantive law to a few clear rules regarding property and contract will
adequately serve the needs of a nation undergoing rapid economic transformation[,] . .. prevent harassment of those who might compete economically with those who are well connected, or satisfy the demands of the
international business community." 199 The idea that restricting substantive
legal reform to the domain of commercial law will expedite economic development becomes far less appealing in this light. Moreover, the reverse
idea-that civil rights and liberties may, in fact, promote economic development by serving to restrain wasteful government corruption and private
200
malfeasance-increases in appeal.
CONCLUSION

To acknowledge the underside of legal reform is neither to be dismissive of the way in which Chinese legal development may be empowering the citizenry, irrespective of the Communist Party's intentions, nor to
make a blanket argument against foreign efforts to assist that
2 01
development.
China has dissembled its formerly centralized socialist state with
astounding speed, but it has yet to set forth a sound ideological basis for the
Id.
198 As United States federal judge and esteemed legal scholar Richard A. Posner
has argued, an extensive system of civil liberties diverts scarce human and judicial
resources from economic productivity that a developing nation can scant afford.
Richard A. Posner, Creating a Legal Frameworkfor Economic Development, 13
WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 1, 9 (1998).
199 Alford, supra note 161; text accompanying note 50.
200 See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999). Sen acknowledges the accomplishments of authoritarian regimes, but maintains that individual
rights and liberties have played a crucial role throughout history in averting economic disaster.
201 Alford, supra note 161, at 1708.
197
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continued rule of the Communist Party. 20 2 Perhaps more to the point, China
has yet to set forth an ideological basis, sound or otherwise, for the rule of
law. 20 3 Economics, capitalism and "market" rhetoric have, to a large extent,
replaced the slogans of China's socialist past yet, they do little to help
China construct for itself the foundations of a stable, prosperous and sustainable rule of law society.
Gradually, the meaning of the rule of law erodes as its champions
in China and abroad use rule of law rhetoric as a proxy for an ever-expanding host of vaguely formulated development outcomes. By encompassing everything, the rule of law now means nothing. A dumbed-down
rule of law creates the false impression that individual, political, civil, and
human rights are being, or will in due time be, adequately provided for,
when in fact, evidence suggests that these crucial dimensions of Chinese
law and society are subject to frequent and increasing abuses by government and individuals.
Motivations for change within China are limited at best, with the
notable exception of those disenfranchised by the status quo, such as migrant families. Likewise, the outside world's erstwhile vanguard of rule of
law reform in China, foreign business, has failed to impact with any positive significance the development of individual, political, civil, or human
rights in the PRC.
Awareness of the injustices currently faced by migrant children undermines the normative expectations that economic development should
rightly precede civil, social, and political development, and that continued
economic development will eventually lead to a strengthening of individual,
political, civil, and human rights in China. Recognizing these shortcomings
of China's law reform is an important early step toward catalyzing broader
substantive law reform in the PRC and, ultimately, toward implementing
the rule of law in China.
See, e.g., Backer, supra note 162, 77-79.
In order to do this, Backer argues, "the CCP must first internalize a rule of law
culture into its own governance, and then into its relationship with the formal political institutions of the state through which it governs" China. Id. at 36.
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